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ABSTRACT 
The Forgotten Signature:  An Observational Study on Policy of Securing Identity in Prevention 
of Identity Theft and Credit/Debit Card Fraud at Retail Stores ’POS Terminals 
by 
Belinda R. Wilson  
Identity theft and credit and bank card fraud is increasing in America and worldwide.  Given the 
current statistics of its prevalence and practices around the world, many in government are 
starting to take critical notice due to its impact on a nation’s economy.  Limited amounts of 
research have been conducted regarding the practices of applying the Routine Activities Theory 
(Cohen & Felson, 1979) to better equip store managers in understanding the critical need for 
capable and effective point of sale guardianship for in-store prevention of credit or bank card 
fraud due to identity theft.  This research has used qualitative observational studies to investigate 
the presence of or lack of capable guardianship at point of sales transactions in large department 
stores where a majority of in-store credit and bank card fraud loss occurs. Findings conclude an 
overwhelming lack of capable guardianship at retail store POS terminals. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Identity theft and bank card fraud has been on the rise in America and worldwide.  According 
to the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, there were 17.6 million 
U.S. residents who reported experiencing identity theft in 2014 alone (Harrell, 2015).  
Surprisingly, two-thirds of these suffered direct financial loss of $99 or less that involved 
fraudulent plastic card purchases.  Accumulatively, “direct and indirect losses from identity theft 
totaled $24.7 billion in 2012” (Harrell, 2013).  Considering the crime is a white collar financial 
crime, it is relatively difficult to assess and most difficult to research and analyze.  Given the 
current statistics of its prevalence and practices around the world, many in government are 
starting to take critical notice due to its impact on a nation’s economy.  Some researchers have 
attempted to understand this phenomena by applying certain criminological theories to their 
research (Hollis, Felson, & Welsh, 2013; Tillyer & Eck, 2011; White & Fisher, 2008).  However, 
extremely limited amounts of research have been conducted regarding the practices of applying 
the Routine Activities Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979) to better equip store managers in 
understanding the critical need for capable and effective point of sale guardianship for in-store 
prevention of credit or bank card fraud due to identity theft (Masuda, 1992; Sampson, Eck, & 
Dunham, 2008; Vaughan, 1998).  This research has explored the absence or presence of capable 
guardianship at point of sales in large department stores where a majority of in-store identity 
theft and plastic card fraud loss occurs. 
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Statement and Significance of the Problem 
According to a U.S. Department of Justice report explaining criminal fraud, in 1998, 
Congress created a new federal offense called “identity theft.”  This new federal offense was a 
result of an infamous case of identity theft where a convicted felon had incurred more than 
$100,000 of credit card debt in the name of is victim.  The identity thieve purchased homes, 
handguns, motorcycles and other costly items before filing for bankruptcy—also in his victim’s 
name (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 2015). Since that first label identifying ‘identity theft,’ a more 
recent publication, Victims of Identity Theft, 2012 Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that “the 
majority of identity theft incidents (85%) involved the fraudulent use of existing account 
information, such as credit and debit card or bank account information” (Harrell & Langton, 
2013).  According to this same report, “direct and indirect losses from identity theft totaled $24.7 
billion in 2012,” in the U.S. alone (Harrell & Langton, 2013).  Identity theft and credit or debit 
forms of plastic card fraud accounted for over 800 million English pounds worth in fraud loss 
worldwide several years ago.    This figure translated to be approximately $1550 million in US 
currency at previous exchange rates (Gee et al., 2010 as cited in Papadopoulos and Brooks, 
2011).  It was reported by other researchers that more than 27 million Americans were victims of 
identity theft and fraud just within five previous years combined (Gerard, Hillison, & Pacini, 
2004 as cited in White & Fisher, 2008).  The numbers have escalated since.  In 2014 alone, an 
“estimated 17.6 million persons, or 7% of all U.S. residents age 16 or older, were victims of one 
or more incidents of identity theft,” up from the 16.6 million persons reported in 2012 (Harrell, 
2015).  It was also reported that “in 2014, the most common type of identity theft was the 
unauthorized misuse or attempted misuse of an existing account and that of those about 79% of 
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victims experienced a single incident of identity theft, while 21% experienced multiple 
incidents” (Harrell, 2015).  
Financial identity theft and fraud occurs when identity thieves use a victim’s personal 
identifying information to conduct fraudulent financial practices that include drawing money 
from a victim’s bank account, opening up a new bank account or other line of credit in the 
victim’s name, or stealing the victim’s personal identifying information for specific purposes of 
creating fake credit cards using the name of the victim—all the while he or she still holds the 
card in hand (White & Fisher, 2008).  Identity theft and credit card fraud can occur online or in-
store and without the victim’s awareness, until after the loss has incurred and their account has 
been damaged.  When this happens, the victim has the primary responsibility of discovering it 
and reporting to their bank institution or credit card company. They in turn attempt to refund the 
loss, while re-distributing the costs of the loss onto the customers.  There is a critical window of 
opportunity for the victim to report the loss in order to minimize it—the first 48-72 hours that his 
or her card is being fraudulently charged.  If a customer gets notice 30 days later when the bill 
arrives in the mail, it may be too late to stop the account from having been drained or the credit 
card from having been completely maxed out.   
 Both in-store and online identity theft and credit fraud is on the increase.  Most research 
has been done on the themes of absence of capable guardianship and the victimization of suitable 
online targets using the routine activities theory (Bossler & Holt, 2009; Choo, 2011; Holtfreter, 
Reisig, & Pratt, 2008; Kleemans, Soudijn, & Weenink, 2012; Pratt, Holtfreter, & Reisig, 2010; 
Reyns, 2010).  One study used integrated theory of Routine Activities Theory (Cohen & 
Felson,1979) and Lifestyle Exposure Theory (Hindelang, Gottfredson, & Garofalo, 1978) to 
conduct an empirical assessment of 204 college students in hopes to gain an overall picture of the 
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relationship between the causal factors and online victimization (Choi, 2008).   According to 
Choi online computer crimes such as these are rarely detected by the victims or reported to the 
police (Choi, 2008, p. 308).  Accounts can be hacked into without the victim’s knowledge until it 
is too late.  “Hacking” refers to the unauthorized access with intent to cause damage, steal 
property (databases containing customers’ account information) and leaving behind some 
evidence of a successful break-in (National White-Collar Crime Center 2003, p.1 as cited in 
Choi, 2008).  White collar crimes are particularly hard to research and prosecute because it is 
difficult to discover the faceless motivated offenders.  So the need for adequate guardianship is 
primary to avoid the attack and the fraud loss incurred.  According to Choi, the crucial key 
purpose of capable guardianship online as well as in real life is to prevent crime (Choi, 2008).  
The results from his empirical assessment demonstrated that the online lifestyle and digital 
guardianship are important aspects of computer crime victimization (Choi, 2008, p. 325).   
Other research studies analyze online statistical fraud detection systems and have been conducted 
around the world in countries such as Australia, Turkey, Korea, and America (Bolton & Hand, 
2002; Choo, 2011; Duman & Ozcelik, 2011; Lee, Cho, Chae, & Shim, 2009).  The problem is 
that the statistical detection systems are only useful after the identity theft and plastic card fraud 
has already occurred and damages have incurred.  By this time, money has been lost and crime 
has prevailed.  There is currently nothing available in research demonstrating technology that is 
capable of acting as a completely reliable and adequate guardian to prevent online or in-store 
identity theft and fraud loss.  The software available is only capable of detecting the fraud once it 
has happened—and that only part of the time.  This lack of adequate technological guardianship 
has given cause for the rise of more sophisticated security measures being placed upon the 
plastic card payment form itself.  Hence, the EMV chip technology, or European Model Visa 
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card security measures have recently been implemented into the United States.  As of October 1, 
2015 the EMV liability shift has changed the face of how merchants are doing business in their 
daily routine activities of accepting Visa and MasterCard plastic card payments.  Visa and 
MasterCard were amongst the first of all credit card companies to make the transition of 
encrypting EMV chip technology into their cards produced for customers residing within the 
United States.  Along with this new technology, comes the accountability of merchants for 
accepting fraudulent card payments.  The merchants and their employees are now being held 
liable and responsible for all chargebacks and fraud loss, rather than the credit card companies 
themselves.  This new EMV liability shift has required a transition from old equipment at in-
store POS terminals to be replaced by new equipment that has capabilities of reading the EMV 
chip encrypted into the new cards.  Due to a backlog of reader approvals and certifications, as 
well as the costly transfer of equipment, many merchants are still in the process of making the 
mandated transition.  Meanwhile, magnetic stripes are still located on the backs of each of the 
cards that are containing the new encrypted EMV chip technology and those strips still contain 
all of the account holders’ personal identifying information and can still be skimmed by devices 
that read magnetic strips.  Many merchants are still using the swipe method of reading the 
magnetic strips to process the transactions at the in-store POS terminals while awaiting 
certification of their new equipment.  This leads to this thesis paper’s initial research question of 
current absence or presence of capable guardianship being demonstrated by merchants and their 
employees at their in-store POS terminals. 
Only limited research has currently been done on the absence of capable guardianship 
regarding in-store purchases (Hollis et al., 2013; Sampson et al., 2010; Tillyer & Eck, 2011).  
Some have applied routine activities theory in attempts to understand how to get a handle on 
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crimes involving fraud.  Others have tried to analyze trends to build a defense (Prabowo, 2011).  
One particular study attempts to analyze the prevalence, clearance rates, and victim/offender 
characteristics (Allison, Schuck, & Lersch, 2005).  Very limited research has been done on actual 
identity theft and credit card fraud prevention itself (Anderson, Durbin, & Salinger, 2008; 
Barker, D’Amato, & Sheridon, 2008).  A few other studies conducted are relative to the topic of 
handlers and managers and raising their guardianship capabilities and accountabilities (Masuda, 
1992; Sampson et al., 2010; Vaughan, 1998).  However, the only current study done within the 
past decade is that of Sampson et al., (2010) applying routine activity theory to explain crime 
prevention success or failure.  This study is an important study to the to the topic of why and 
how in-store point of sales transactions are critical junctures of catching identity thieves and 
credit card fraudsters by holding the managers liable as “super controllers for crime prevention” 
(Sampson et al., 2010).  A final relevant study to the topic of in-store identity theft and credit 
card fraud can be found in an article published by  Journal of Business Research, entitled 
“Repercussions of promoting an ideology of consumption:  Consumer misbehavior” (Fullerton & 
Punj, 2004).  This article describes consumer misbehaviors coming in many forms such as 
shoplifting, vandalism, credit card fraud, and physical or verbal abuse of other consumers and of 
marketer employees (Fullerton & Punj, 2004).  Due to these consumer misbehaviors, it is 
suspected that many businesses would prefer to chalk fraud loss up to the costs of doing business 
rather than jeopardize employees’ safety or allow credit card fraudsters to create an atmosphere 
of disharmony within the store and frighten other customers causing the store to lose their 
business. 
Policy making and policing of identity theft and credit and bank card fraud present 
additional challenges.  According to research, 40% of it goes unreported to police authorities 
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(Papadopoulos & Brooks, 2011; White & Fisher, 2008).  There is a call for new public 
management for policing of fraud (Doig, Johnson, & Levi, 2001).  There is also a need for 
offender-based research to inform policy on adequate guardianship prevention methods (Copes 
& Vieraitis, 2009; Copes, Veiratis, & Jochum, 2007).  As previously discussed, new changes in 
policy have been made by Visa and MasterCard regarding the EMV liability shift that took place 
beginning October 1, 2015.  But those policy changes in credit card companies alone, even with 
the new EMV chip card encryptions, are questionably inadequate in handling the job of policing 
this crime or preventing it, which became inherently evident during the field research and 
observational studies accumulated for this thesis.   
 Based upon the review of the most available material on this topic of research, it is 
apparent there is a need for redefining capable guardianship.  As demonstrated through various 
applications to the many elements surrounding identity theft and plastic card fraud, it is 
warranted that routine activities theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson, 2008; Felson & Clarke, 
1998) is the most applicable criminology theory for explaining this phenomenon.  The absence 
of capable guardianship prevails over fraudulent plastic card transactions and demonstrates dire 
need of research in efforts of understanding the problem and why there is such negligence. This 
research is necessary as serious study for developing future policies for creating a presence of 
capable guardianship in order to more effectively deter and prevent this crime.  The dominant 
themes throughout the body of research materials has covered various aspects relating to routine 
activities theory regarding motivated offenders and suitable targets, yet it has minimally 
addressed the reasoning of why there is absence of capable guardianship when customers pay 
with plastic cards.  This absence of capable guardianship has allowed identity theft and plastic 
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card fraud crimes to continue to grow by leaps and bounds—both within the cyber world and the 
real physical world.  
Purpose of this Research 
 The purpose of this research is to investigate by first-hand field observations the absence 
or presence of capable guardianship at point-of-sale (POS) terminals within retail store chains 
that are known to be highly targeted for identity theft in conjunction with credit, debit or bank 
card fraud.  (See pages 61- 62 of this thesis).  A majority of bank cards bear the logo of either 
Visa or MasterCard.  Both Visa and MasterCard mandate certain rules and regulations to be 
followed by merchants and their employees as outlined by their merchant agreement contracts 
(See Appendices C & D).  Banks also have their own specific rules and regulations that are to be 
adhered to in order for the merchant to accept the card bearing the Visa or MasterCard logo for 
payment (See Appendix B). 
Specifically, these rules require that each card must bear the legal cardholder’s genuine 
signature on the back of the card within the signature strip that is located below the magnetic 
strip and beside the CVV code.  Either above or below each signature strip located on the back of 
each card, are the words that read, “AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE – NOT VALID UNLESS 
SIGNED” (See Appendix C).  Point-of-sale face-to-face transactions that occur within retail 
stores, with cards in hands of customers, are considered by both Visa and MasterCard to be the 
least risky transactions of all because the merchant’s employees have the opportunity to 
investigate the identity of the customers paying with a plastic card method, and are required to 
do so if the card is not signed.  The steps that the employees must follow at the POS terminal 
during the transaction are outlined by Bank Rules, Visa, and MasterCard (See Appendices B, C, 
& D for details).  This investigator believes that the responsibility of acting as a capable guardian 
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that is placed upon the merchant and its employees is one that is often neglected and dismissed, 
thus it is also a contributing factor to the increase of identity theft related to card fraud.    
Research Questions Addressed and Hypotheses 
Specifically, the following questions were addressed and hypothesized: 
RQ1:  The first research question contains five parts:  1) Will the cashier at the point of 
sale transaction act as a capable guardian over the face-to-face transaction and act to help prevent 
identity theft and credit/debit card fraud by taking the card into his or her hand to visually check 
the back of the credit or debit card to see if it bears an authorized signature by the legal 
cardholder, or check the account number on the card and compare it to that in the system or 
receipt in according to the merchant agreement rules as mandated by the Bank Rules and 
Regulations, Visa and MasterCard?  (See Appendices B, C, & D).  Variables investigated:   
2) Will the variables of non-electronic versus electronic purchase increase levels of capable 
guardianship?  Will there be a difference in the level of capable guardianship if the purchase is 
made at the back electronic counter POS terminal versus the store’s front end POS terminal?  3) 
Will the higher amount of purchase charges to the card raise levels of guardianship at POS 
terminals with electronic purchases compared to a low levels of guardianship for small charges 
to the card?  4)  Will the variables of time segment of day or night and business or lack thereof 
give increase or decrease to the levels of capable guardianship?  5)  Will there be a difference of 
levels of guardianship based upon gender or race of the employee processing the transaction at 
each POS terminal? 
Ho1:  There will be an overall generalized absence of capable guardianship at the POS 
terminals during the face-to-face card in hand transaction, and the cashiers will not act as a 
capable guardians over the card accounts in keeping with Bank Rules, Visa and MasterCard 
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merchant agreement contracts in efforts to prevent identity theft.  They will not take the card in 
hand at any point during the transaction to specifically compare the account number listed on the 
face of the card to that showing in the system nor will the cashier specifically check the back of 
the card to see if it has been validated by an authorized signature.  Variable Hypotheses:            
2) There will be a slight to significant difference between levels of guardianship when the 
purchase is an electronics purchase versus a non-electronic purchase or whether the purchase 
was made at the store’s front end register or back electronic counter register.  3)  There will be a 
higher level of capable guardianship demonstrated by participants at POS terminals when the 
charges to the credit card are over $50 versus those under $50.  4)  There may be a slight 
difference in higher levels of guardianship depending upon the business of the store or lack 
thereof.    5)  There will be no difference if the cashier is male nor female, Black or White.  
Overall, there will be a generalized absence of capable guardianship at the POS terminals within 
each store chain by all participants, with higher levels of guardianship being demonstrated only 
by those participants processing electronics purchases. 
RQ2:  Will the cashier at the face-to-face transaction at the POS (point-of-sale) terminal 
require the cardholder and purchaser to sign the back of the unsigned card used for purchase, and 
will he or she make her show a government issued photo identification for verification of her 
identity before the transaction is allowed to be processed through, in keeping with merchant 
agreement rules as mandated by Bank Rules and Regulations, Visa and MasterCard? 
Ho2:  The cashier will not check the back of the card, and therefore, will not check for an 
authorized signature validated the card.  Consequently, the cashier will neither ask her to show a 
government issued photo identification document bearing her genuine signature for comparison 
or verifying her identity before the transaction will be allowed to be processed through to its 
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entirety.  Ultimately, it is hypothesized that the cashier will not abide by the Bank Rules and 
Regulations, the Visa merchant rules for accepting unsigned cards, nor the MasterCard rules for 
accepting unsigned cards (See Appendices B, C, & D for references).    
RQ3:  Will the cashier act in lieu of an FDE (Forensic Document Examiner) to 
investigate by visual comparison the general similarities or differences of handwriting 
demonstrated on the government issued photo identification bearing a genuine signature of the 
researcher to that of the unsigned card that should be required to be signed in the presence of the 
cashier at the POS terminal? 
Ho3:  The cashier will not check the back of the card, and therefore, will not check for an 
authorized signature validating the card; thus, he or she will neither attempt to ask the researcher 
to sign the back of the card nor show government photo identification bearing her genuine 
signature, nor will he or she act in lieu of an FDE to investigate by general visual comparison the 
general similarities or differences of the handwriting on the government issued identification to 
that of the signature on the back of the card per requested signature.  The cashier will not request 
a signature on the back of the card, and the only signature requested will be that prompted by the 
electronic signature capturing device at POS terminal.  
RQ4:  Will the cashier rely solely upon the electronic capturing device to verify the 
signature and not personally look at it himself or herself?  
RQ5:  Will the participant cashier at the POS terminal solely depend upon the EMC chip 
reader technology newly implemented at the POS terminals equipped with such to “guard” over 
the identity of the cardholder, even when neither a PIN number nor signature is required nor 
requested for the transaction to be processed? 
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Ho4 and Ho5:  The cashier participant processing the transaction will demonstrate heavy 
reliance upon the electronic signature capturing device, if a signature is required, and/or the 
EMV chip reader technology to “guard” over the face-to-face card in hand sales transaction at 
the POS terminal, whether a PIN is requested or required or not. 
Limitations of the Study 
This field research was limited strictly to observations made as a credit card payment 
purchaser in 28 separate large department stores of three commonly targeted chains—all located 
within the tri-state region of Eastern Tennessee, Western Virginia, and Northeastern North 
Carolina and one in Georgia.  Therefore, it lacks sufficient quantity for external validity and 
large generalizability.  Additionally, it does not involve guardianship issues related to online 
identity theft and credit or debit card fraud that is also a major contributor of fraud.  The internal 
validity is weakened in that this study only portrays the observations of those representatives 
sampled within this specific region.  Therefore, the information gathered and coded for this 
analysis is restricted to observations only and not interviews with individual managers or 
employees, which may yield additional insight to findings.  There is little criminological research 
done on this specific area of adequate guardianship at point of sale transactions involving in store 
merchant sales clerk employees or managers and their adherence to the merchant agreement 
contracts as mandated by Visa, MasterCard and Bank Rules (See Appendix B, C, & D).  To date, 
no criminology research has been reported analyzing why large scale identity theft in credit and 
debit card fraud occurs at specific large department store chains or why they are strongly 
considered as suitable targets by motivated fraud offenders.   
This field research study is the first of its kind and, therefore, limited to understanding the 
nature and origin of the problem from a criminological theoretical perspective and observations 
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made during first hand face-to-face transactions at POS terminals within three specific retail 
store chains only. Observing other retail store chains during card in hand transactions may yield 
different results depending upon the other merchant’s rigidity of adherence to merchant 
agreement contracts and responsibilities of verifying identity of cardholders during POS face-to-
face transactions. Other limitations also included are those inherently related to consumer 
profiling and these are restricted in this particular study to the investigator’s personal 
characteristics and demographics of a white conservative middle-class middle-aged female.  
Consumers with various individual characteristics and demographics may prompt different 
reactions from the employees at POS terminals during face-to-face transactions yielding different 
results. 
Definitions of Terms 
 For a clearer understanding of this thesis, the following terms are defined: 
Authentication:  “Authentication is the process of assuring that a credit card transaction 
has been initiated by an authorized user of that card. From the merchant's point of view, 
authentication means getting the right information from the consumer, and having it verified by 
the transaction network. In recent years, authentication has been stepped up by means including 
security codes on credit cards” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Authorization:  “Authorization is an important concept for both credit cardholders and 
credit card merchant accounts. Every retailer has a purchase limit above which they must seek 
authorization from the card issuer before they can complete the sale. Such authorization can be 
done by telephone or electronically at the cash register. Authorization is used to control credit 
card fraud. Authorization is also the first step in processing a credit card. After a merchant 
swipes the card, the data is submitted to merchant’s bank, called an acquirer, to request 
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authorization for the sale. The acquirer then routes the request to the card-issuing bank, where it 
is authorized or denied, and the merchant is allowed to process the sale” 
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Authorized Transaction:   “In credit card terminology, an authorized transaction is one 
that has been approved” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Bank Card: A bank card is a form of a plastic payment method that is distributed by one’s 
bank and allows the account holder and thus, cardholder, to make purchases using one’s card as 
either debit or credit payment while deducting available funds from one’s account.  All bank 
cards bear either the Visa or MasterCard logo and are subject to each one’s respective rules and 
regulations for honoring the card at merchants’ stores.   
Capable Guardianship:  Capable guardianship is one of the elements missing in the crime 
triangle developed by criminologists, Felson and Cohen (1979).  The absence of capable 
guardianship is what contributes to crime occurrences.  The presence of capable guardianship 
deters crime from happening.  In the aspect of this thesis, capable guardianship in the 
environment of daily routine activities of shopping would require that the employees, 
specifically those at the POS terminals would vigilantly guard the sales transactions, checking 
for appropriate signatures and identity, in efforts to obey the rules and regulations set forth by 
Visa and MasterCard in their merchant agreement policies, to help prevent identity theft and 
card-present fraudulent transactions.   
Cardholder:  A cardholder is the person holding the card in hand in preparation of making 
purchases either online, or for this research purpose, in store during face-to-face transactions at 
POS terminals within each store.  A cardholder has the responsibility of providing a genuine 
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signature and government issued photo identification for verification at POS terminals, when and 
if requested by the cashier or manager during transactions.   
Card Present:  “Card-present transactions are those in which a credit card is physically 
present. Merchants are charged different levels of fees by the card transaction processors (such 
as Visa, MasterCard), depending on the level of fraud risk. Card present transactions, because the 
card is available for inspection, are considered less risky and therefore carry lower fees than 
online or phone transactions” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Card Present Fraud:  “Card-present fraud occurs when a credit or debit card is used to 
make an unauthorized transaction in a face-to-face setting, such as a grocery store checkout lane. 
This type of fraud may involve the use of the actual stolen card or a fraudulent duplicated card 
made using a card number and magnetic stripe information” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Card-Present (CP) Transactions:  “Credit or debit card transactions conducted face-to-
face, in which the card is physically swiped. Card-present transactions are considered more 
secure than card-not-present transactions, since a merchant can view the buyer, the card and the 
signature on it” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Chargeback:  “A credit card chargeback occurs when a charge is reversed, returning 
credit to a credit card customer from a merchant. There are several parties involved, since a 
return transaction goes through the customer's bank, the credit card processing interchange (such 
as Visa or MasterCard) and the merchant's bank. Consumers can sometimes initiate a chargeback 
when they dispute a purchase made from a merchant”  
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
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Chip Enabled Terminal:  “Point-of-sale terminals that have or are connected to a chip 
card reader, an EMV application and can process chip card transactions. ATMs can also be chip-
enabled.  (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Chip and Pin Cards:   “A type of ‘smart card,’ chip-and-PIN cards use computer chips to 
store and process information instead of, or in addition to, a magnetic stripe. A personal 
identification number (PIN) is required at point of sale. The technology has replaced older-style 
magnetic stripes in Europe and is being adopted in much of the world. The United States has 
been slow to adopt the technology, but has begun to do so, especially with credit cards intended 
for international travelers” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Chip and Signature:    “Chip and signature describes a form of credit card authentication 
coming into use in the United States. Traditionally, American credit cards were authorized for 
use via the data on magnetic stripes on the backs of the cards. As their name implies, chip-and-
signature cards have a chip embedded within them, and the authority to use them is verified by 
signature. Chip-and-signature cards are an advancement in security over magnetic stripes, but not 
as secure as chip-and-PIN cards, which are verified with a PIN number” 
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).  
Cloning:  “Cloning is a technique criminals use to make counterfeit credit cards with 
working, stolen credit card numbers. The credit card numbers are often obtained through 
skimming” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Credit Card:  “A credit card is a payment card that is accepted by merchants, and which 
can be read at the point of sale. Credit cards offer revolving lines of credit to cardholders, which 
means they have the ability to pay balances over time”  (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
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Credit Card Number:  “A credit card number is the unique number imprinted on a credit 
card. The first six digits on a credit card are called the issuer identification number. They identify 
the issuer -- Discover, or American Express, for example. The remaining digits of a credit card 
number are unique to the individual card. Credit card numbers are usually embossed, a remnant 
the days when a physical impression of credit cards were made through zip-zap machines” 
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Credit/Debit Card Fraud:  Credit or debit card fraud is the act of stealing another person’s 
identity for the purpose of using that person’s account to purchase items for oneself or to be 
resold for profit.  Credit/debit card fraud occurs when someone has used another person’s plastic 
card payment method without permission and without being an authorized user on the account.  
Identity theft is the primary crime occurring, while theft is the secondary.   
Crime Triangle:   The “crime triangle” is a theory developed by criminologists, Marcus 
Felson and Lawrence Cohen, the creators of the Routine Activities Theory (1979).  It 
demonstrates the convergence of three essential ingredients necessary for crime to take place—
motivated offenders, suitable targets, and an absence of capable guardianship.  See Figure 1 
below: 
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Figure 1.  The “Crime Triangle” demonstrates the three necessary elements for a crime to occur:  
1) Suitable Targets, 2) Motivated Offenders, 3) Absence of Capable Guardianship.  This was 
developed by criminologists, Cohen and Felson (1979).  
CVV:   “CVV is one of the credit card industry's several acronyms for the credit card 
security code that helps verify the legitimacy of a credit card. Depending on the card, the security 
code can be a three-digit or four-digit number, printed on either on the back of the card or the 
front. CVV stands for ‘card verification value’ code. Other card issuers call their security codes 
CVV2 (Visa), CVC2 (MasterCard) or CID (American Express)” 
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Debit Card:  “While debit cards and credit cards are alike in appearance, they differ in 
one critical aspect: A debit card withdraws money from a bank account, while a credit card 
creates a loan. Think of them as ‘pay now’ (debit) versus ‘pay later’ (credit). Today's debit card 
users often have the choice of authorizing transactions by either PIN or signature. While that 
choice often makes no difference to the consumer, it makes a great deal of difference to the 
merchant and transaction processors. A PIN transaction uses one payment system, the signature 
uses another, each carrying different fees” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
EMV Card:  “An EMV card, also called a chip-and-PIN card or smart card, contains a 
special computer chip to store card account data. Unlike magnetic-stripe cards, every time an 
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EMV card is used for payment, the chip creates a unique transaction code that cannot be reused, 
thus stymying counterfeit card fraud. The initials EMV stand for Europay, MasterCard and Visa 
-- the three processing firms that in 2002 first agreed to the standards. EMV cards are widespread 
in Europe and other parts of the world, and are being rolled out in the 
U.S.”(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
EMV Chip Card Technology:  “EMV® is a global standard for credit and debit payment 
cards based on chip card technology taking its name from the card schemes Europay, 
MasterCard, and Visa - the original card schemes that developed it. The standard covers the 
processing of credit and debit card payments using a card that contains a microprocessor chip” 
(What Is EMV Chip Card Technology?, n.d.).   
EMV Liability Shift: “Under rules instituted by MasterCard, Visa, American Express and 
Discover, as of Oct. 1, 2015, in-store counterfeit fraud liability shifted to the party -- either the 
card issuing financial institution or the merchant -- that had not adopted EMV technology. 
Before, credit card issuers were primarily responsible for covering fraud affecting consumer 
accounts. While issuers will still reverse charges for fraud victims, they may now seek 
reimbursement from the merchant or merchant acquirer if the merchant had not installed EMV-
compatible equipment when fraudulent charges were made on an EMV card” 
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Encryption:  “In credit card terms, encryption is the process of encoding credit card 
information for secure transmission through credit card processing networks or across the 
Internet” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Face-to-Face Transaction:  A face-to-face transaction is one that occurs inside the 
merchant’s store and is processed via means of a card-present transaction, which is considered 
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by the credit card companies to be the least risky type since the employee has the opportunity to 
verify identity of the cardholder during the face-to-face transaction process.  
False Positives:  “In fraud detection, a "false positive" occurs when something innocent is 
wrongly deemed suspicious. Credit card holders encounter false positives most often occurs 
when a cardholder accidentally trips the card issuer's fraud detection system. Card issuers have 
developed sophisticated, automated fraud detection systems that work by detecting activities and 
patterns associated with fraud, but these systems don't work perfectly. False positives can cause a 
cardholder's transaction to be denied or an account locked down” 
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
FDE:  FDE stands for “Forensic Document Examiner” and is a professional that studies 
handwriting and can determine with expertise the differences between spurious signatures and 
handwriting and genuine signatures and handwriting for legal purposes.  FDE’s are often called 
upon in court to testify as to the validity of a document in question.  For the purpose of this thesis 
research, the guardian at the POS terminal is called upon by the Visa and MasterCard regulations 
to fill the role of the FDE in store to visually compare the signatures on the back of the card to 
that of the government issued identification presumed to be bearing a genuine signature. 
Fraud Alert:  “A fraud alert is a security alert placed on a credit card account or credit 
bureau listing by either the customer or the issuer when a fraudulent account activity is either 
experienced or suspected”  (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Fraudulent Transaction:  “A fraudulent transaction is one unauthorized by the credit card 
holder. Such transactions are categorized as lost, stolen, not received, issued on a fraudulent 
application, counterfeit, fraudulent processing of transactions, account takeover or other 
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fraudulent conditions as defined by the card company or the member company” 
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).  
Fraudulent User:  “A fraudulent user is an individual who is not the credit cardholder or 
designee and who uses a credit card account to obtain goods or services without the cardholder's 
consent.  (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Genuine Signature:  A genuine signature is a signature that has been created by the 
person whose name the signature bears.  It is a forensic document examination term that declares 
the true handwriting of the legitimate party involved.  In this thesis, a genuine signature refers to 
the signature of the account cardholder on the back of the credit or debit card and verified by the 
genuine signature on the government issued photo identification.   
Hacking:  Hacking is the act of a person or persons involved in a crime ring who secretly 
gain access to a computer system in efforts to steal information.  In this thesis, hacking can also 
refer to the actions of those who use skimming or shimming devices in order to gain access to 
legitimate account information of cardholders, for purposes of stealing the information to make 
fraudulent cards and purchase merchandise from retail stores illegally.   
Identity Theft:  “Identity theft, commonly shortened to ID theft, is generally defined as 
the use of personal information to commit fraud. The personal information used can vary; the 
more personal information a thief has, the greater the financial damage that can be caused. 
Identity theft can happen in many ways, through account hijacking, ‘phishing,’ dumpster diving 
or, sadly, by relatives stealing personal information” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Magnetic Stripe:  “A stripe of magnetic information that is affixed to the back of a plastic 
credit or debit card. It can be black, brown or silver in color. It is the common type of card in the 
United States today. Often, it's called a ‘magnetic swipe’ card, because the card is activated by 
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swiping it through a device that can read the data in the stripe. The credit card's magnetic stripe 
contains three tracks of data. Each track is about one-tenth of an inch wide. The first and second 
tracks in the magnetic stripe are encoded with information about the cardholder's account, such 
as their credit card number, full name, the card's expiration date and the country code. Additional 
information can be stored in the third track. With the new generation of credit cards, such as chip 
cards, no magnetic stripe is needed. Also called magnetic strip or magstripe” 
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
MasterCard card:  “A card that bears the MasterCard symbol, enabling a MasterCard 
cardholder to obtain goods, services or cash from a MasterCard merchant or acquirer. 
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Merchant Agreement:  “A merchant agreement is a document that lets merchants accept 
credit cards. It is a contract between a merchant and a bank and it lays out their respective rights, 
duties and warranties regarding how each will handle bank card activity” 
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Not Valid:  A credit or debit card is considered “not valid” for purchases by Visa or 
MasterCard if it has not been properly and genuinely signed by the legal cardholder of the 
account on the back of the card within the signature strip.  Near the strip reads the wording, 
“AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE – NOT VALID UNLESS SIGNED.”  If the card is not valid, 
rules and regulations require that the card must be signed in the presence of the cashier at the 
POS terminal and the customer must show proper government issued photo identification 
bearing the genuine signature of the cardholder for visual comparison.   
Phishing:  “Phishing is a criminal technique that uses computers to steal credit or debit 
card or bank account information. Consumers often see phishing attempts in the form of fake e-
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mails that mimic those of banks. Consumers who click on such copycat e-mails will be 
transferred to a phony site that will try to dupe them into entering Social Security or bank 
account numbers” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
PIN: “A PIN, or personal identification number, is a series of digits (usually four) used to 
verify the identity of the holder of a card. The PIN is a kind of password. Consumers often may 
choose whether to authorize a debit card transaction by signature or PIN; while it may make no 
difference to consumers, the choice means they are choosing different transaction processing 
systems”  (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
POS:  “The ‘point of sale’, or POS, is the location in a merchant's establishment at which 
the sale is consummated by payment for goods or services received. It is also where many 
retailers offer their store's credit card applications to consumers”  
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
RAM scraping attack:  “A process in which thieves hack a merchant's point-of-sale 
system and search its memory for payment card data while it is still being processed inside the 
terminal” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
RAT:  RAT or Routine Activities Theory is a criminology theory developed by two 
theorists, Marcus Felson and Lawrence Cohen (1979) that describes how crime must have three 
key elements in order to occur in our daily activities.  These three elements are:  1) Suitable 
Targets, 2) Absence of Capable Guardianship, and 3) Motivated Offenders.  (See Figure 1.  
Crime Triangle for reference.)  According to Felson and Cohen, RAT can explain many crimes, 
particularly theft.  By manipulating one of the elements of the crime triangle, crimes can be 
prevented.  RAT is used to explain the theory behind this research thesis, and is demonstrated by 
the research itself in confirming the absence of the capable guardianship at the POS terminals 
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during face-to-face in store transactions with card in hand affording ample opportunities for back 
of card to be checked for proper signature and verified by proper identification, as mandated by 
Visa’s and MasterCard’s rules and regulations via merchant agreement contracts.  Thus, if the 
absence of capable guardianship continues, the crime of identity theft and plastic card fraud 
continues; if the presence of capable guardianship replaces the absence, then the crime is 
deterred. 
RFID:  “Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology is increasingly used in 
everything from library books to key fobs that let office workers in their buildings to credit 
cards. They transmit very short range radio signals that a receiving device reads before it decides 
whether to let you check out a book, get to your cubicle or pay for that venti Cinnamon Dolce 
Frappuccino” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Security Code:  “The security code on a credit card is the brief number that is printed on 
the card that helps verify its legitimacy. Depending on the card, the security code can be a three-
digit or four-digit number, printed on either on the back of the card or the front, and goes by 
several names. The most common is CVV, which stands for ‘card verification value’ code. Other 
card issuers call their security codes CVV2 (Visa), CVC2 (MasterCard) or CID (American 
Express)” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Shimming:  Shimming is an act of using a shimmer device, as those found last summer in 
Mexico at ATM machines, that sits between the EMV chip on the card and the chip reader to 
record the data on the chip as the card is being read by the ATM or POS terminal (Krebs, 2015).  
Signature Strip:  “A signature strip is an area on the back of a card coated with a white or 
gray material that holds ink. Imprinted above it are words to the effect of ‘Authorized signature, 
Not valid unless signed.’ Some people write ‘Show ID’ in place of their signature, in an effort to 
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discourage unauthorized use. While that may work in practice, merchants are not supposed to 
accept such cards” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Skimmer:  “A credit card skimmer is a small device that lets a thief swipe a magnetic 
stripe credit card and surreptitiously record the information on it. A skimmer can be hand-held or 
installed where you would expect a legitimate card reader, such as an ATM machine or a gas 
pump” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Skimming:  “Skimming is a method of stealing credit card information by using a small 
electronic device that scans and stores card data from the magnetic stripe. It can be done 
manually by a corrupt retail store employee who surreptitiously skims customers' cards, or by 
criminals who place a skimming device on top of a regular credit card reader (usually at gas 
stations or ATMs machines). Stolen credit card information can be used to make fraudulent 
purchases online or to clone new cards” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Smishing:  “Smishing is a technique used by criminals to steal bank or credit card 
information using text messages. In such an incident, the mobile device user receives a fake text 
message that appears to be from a bank. The text message may request that the consumer call a 
phone number to provide card or account information to a criminal posing as a bank employee” 
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Spurious Signature:  A spurious signature is a signature that is not genuine.  The 
terminology relates to questionable signatures in the field of forensic document examination.  In 
this thesis, it relates to the unsigned credit or debit card that would require a genuine signature, 
verified by identity documentation, in the presence of the capable guardian at the POS terminal, 
or failure to do so.  If the cardholder and user provided a signature that was not able to be 
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visually comparable to that on a government issued photo ID, then it would be considered a 
“spurious signature.” 
Supercontrollers:  For the purposes of this thesis, “Supercontrollers” are referred to as the 
employees (and managers training the employees, as well as merchants who are responsible for 
their employees).  This definition expounds upon the idea set forth by theorists Sampson and Eck 
who argue “that not only should managers and employees act as guardians, but also act as “super 
controllers” (2010, p. 37).  In their article, “Super controllers and crime prevention:  a routine 
activity explanation of crime prevention success and failure,” Sampson et al. raise awareness as 
to why people and organizations take (or fail to take) preventative action against crime (Bowers 
& Johnson, 2006; Knutson, 2006; Laycock, 2006 all as cited in Sampson & Eck, 2010, p. 37).   
Synthetic Identity Theft:  “Synthetic identity theft is when a fraudster creates a new and 
fictional identity from fake information or from combining some real identifying information 
with inaccurate or false information. Once crafted, the unreal synthetic identity is used to 
establish real bank accounts” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Terminal:  For this thesis, a terminal is defined as the location of the register where the 
point-of-sale (POS) occurs.  It is referred to throughout this body of text as the “POS terminal.” 
This research accessed two specific terminal locations:  1) Electronics counters located in the 
back of individual retail stores used primarily for electronic purchases, and 2) Front registers 
located in the front end of each retail store used for general purchases, primarily non-electronic 
purchases.   (See Table 3.  POS (Point-of-Sale Terminal Location within Store during Face-to-
Face Transactions for reference.) 
Transaction:  “(1) Any agreement between two or more parties that establishes a legal 
obligation. (2) The act of carrying out such an obligation. (3) All activities affecting a deposit 
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account that are performed at the request of the account holder. (4) All events that cause some 
change in the assets, liabilities or net worth of a business. (5) An action between a cardholder 
and a merchant or a cardholder and a member that results in activity on the cardholder account” 
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Two-factor Authentication:  “Two-factor authentication is a form of identification often 
used in making sure a credit card transaction is authorized. Typically one factor may be a 
physical object (such as having a credit card in your possession), another may be a piece of 
knowledge (such as a PIN number or security code number), and yet another may be a unique 
characteristic (such as a fingerprint, an iris pattern or the ability to retype a sequence of numbers 
and letters). The presence of two factors allows a two-factor authentication” 
(Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Unsigned Card:  An unsigned card is plastic card used for payment that the legal 
cardholder and account owner has failed to sign.  Many people do not sign the back of their cards 
for fear of someone imitating their signature, but write “See ID” instead in the strip.  This is still 
considered an unsigned card and does not validate the card for payment processing.  The 
unsigned card is mandated by Visa and MasterCard rules and regulations to be signed in the 
presence of the cashier and verified by government issued photo identification bearing a genuine 
signature for general visual comparison purposes, before the transaction can legally occur.  
However, this practice has been and continues to be neglected in day to day practices at retail 
store POS terminals.   
User Authentication:  “User authentication is the process of validating a credit card user's 
identity or authorized user status. User authentication is an important part of a merchant's duties 
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in accepting credit card, although in practice, authentication has in recent years become often 
cursory or nonexistent” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.). 
Valid:  For the purposes of this thesis, valid refers to the credit or debit card bearing a 
genuine signature by the legal cardholder, and account user, written in the signature strip on the 
back of the plastic card near the words, “Authorized signature, not valid unless signed.”  
Visa Card:  “A card that bears the Visa symbol and which enables a Visa cardholder to 
obtain goods, services or cash from a Visa merchant or acquirer, and have the transaction 
processed through its network. Visa does not itself issue credit or debit cards, but partners with 
card-issuing financial institutions” (Creditcards.com/glossary, n.d.).  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Theory 
How can one effectively and solely ‘guard’ one’s bank accounts and credit card property 
sufficiently in a world rapidly and continuously advancing in technologies—even amongst the 
underground crime ring world? Despite the fact that laws have been enacted as guardians, and 
credit card companies continually add more security features to act as capable guardians, 
including the newest one of the EMV chip technology to institute safeguards, it is apparent that 
law, current security features and policy changes in and of themselves cannot entirely curtail 
identity theft and card fraud. There is still an overwhelming absence of capable guardianship.  
This phenomenon can best be explained by the routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979) 
that was first developed by criminologists Marcus Felson and Lawrence Cohen using a triangular 
model, which represents the convergence of three essential ingredients necessary for crime to 
take place—motivated offenders, suitable targets, and an absence of guardianship (see also: 
Felson, 1995; Felson 2002, 2006; Felson & Boba, 2010; Felson & Clarke, 1998).  Bernburg and 
Thorlindsson (2001, pg. 546) report that several attempts have been made to study “routine 
activities with individuals as the unit of analysis” and these studies support the hypothesis that 
“deviant events are more likely to occur when routine activities, such as simply using one’s 
credit card on a routine basis for purchases, increase the convergence” of time, space, absent 
guardianship at several different level, availability of suitable targets, and motivated offenders 
(Hawdon, 1996; Lasley, 1989; Massey et al., 1989; Miethe et al., 1987; Mustaine & Tewksbury, 
1998a, 1988b, 1988c; Osgood et al., 1996;  Sampson & Woolredge, 1987). 
 Ronald Clarke and Marcus Felson (1998) make an important transition from 
criminological studies of offenders to detailed analysis of criminal events and criminal activities 
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with their “crime triangle” (Lilly et al., 2011, p. 339). Together they explain the crime triangle 
based upon a rational choice perspective of offending as techniques of situational crime 
prevention.  Routine activities theory was founded by Cohen and Felson (1979) describing how 
crime needs three essential ingredients to occur:  motivated offenders, suitable targets, and an 
absence of capable guardians.  Crime needs a convergence in space and time for all three to 
occur simultaneously.  If one of the elements is missing, then crime cannot occur, according to 
the Cohen and Felson “crime triangle” model (1979).  This means that a crime can be prevented 
by keeping motivated offenders away from suitable targets “at specific points in time and space” 
or “by increasing the presence of capable guardianship,” (Kleemans et al., 2012, p. 87).  By 
increasing efforts, increasing risks, reducing rewards, reducing provocation, and removing 
excuses valiant efforts can be made to prevent specific crimes that can occur during routine 
activities of everyday life (Kleemans et al., 2012, p. 87-88).  One particular area of crime that 
occurs in everyday life of American consumers, which is in great need of prevention and 
intervention by capable guardianship, is that of identity theft and credit/debit bank card fraud. 
This crime can best be explained theoretically by routine activities theory (Cohen & Felson, 
1979).  Routine activities theory has been applied by various criminology researchers in efforts 
to explain a variety of crime issues for more than 30 years (Boetig, 2006, p. 12). These include 
robbery, rape, residential burglary and theft (Boetig, 2006, p. 13-14). This paper will extend the 
application of routine activities theory from physical thefts to include stealing from remote 
locations as will be described in methods of identity theft and credit card fraud. Applying the 
routine activities theory approach, this thesis has attempted to explain how this phenomenon’s 
various aspects are completely understood by using this criminological theoretical structure.    
Understanding this theory is critical to investigating and understanding credit card fraud. 
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Credit Card Fraud 
For many years now, it has been a known fact that credit card fraud has become a 
growing problem not only within the United States, but also within the international global 
economic community. According to the latest statistics published by the U.S. Department of 
Justice in their recent publication of Victims of Identity Theft, 2014 alone an “estimated 17.6 
million persons, or 7% of all U.S. residents age 16 or older, were victims of one or more 
incidents of identity theft,” up from the 16.6 million persons reported in 2012 (Harrell, 2015).  
Surprisingly, two-thirds of these suffered direct financial loss of $99 or less that involved 
fraudulent plastic card purchases.  Accumulatively, “direct and indirect losses from identity theft 
totaled $24.7 billion in 2012” (Harrell, 2013). There is an estimated minimum loss of 800 billion 
English pounds per year due to credit and debit card fraud worldwide (Gee et al., 2010 as cited in 
Papadopoulos and Brooks, 2011, p. 222).  Interestingly enough, 71% of all worldwide revolving 
credit cards in operation today were issued in the US, according to FBI Special Agent Slotter, 
who served as a CPA in the New Haven, Connecticut Field Office (Slotter, 1997, p. 2).  In the 
United States alone, Visa and MasterCard reported a loss of $875 million US dollars in 1995 
(Slotter, 1997, p. 2).  With credit and debit cards rapidly replacing cash and check transactions 
for many businesses, new opportunities are presented daily for exploitation.  The American 
Bankers Association reported that 45% of US consumers used less cash and more plastic 
payment methods between the years of 2004 and 2006 (Smith, 2007, p. 37).  Consumerism is a 
cultural way of life in America, but it appears using cash for transactions are becoming less of a 
tradition.  As many gluttonous American consumers, having insatiable appetites (Durkheim, 
1951) are attempting to maintain popular consumerist lifestyles, people of this country are 
extremely vulnerable.  Oftentimes, many have easily fallen prey to victimization by others in 
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deviant acts of fraud unknowingly.  As legitimate credit or bank debit card owners, people are 
advised to diligently and vigilantly protect their personal identifying information and property 
from identity thieves and potential credit/debit card fraudsters, and to check their accounts 
regularly.  Educational efforts are made by the CIA in distribution of brochures for bank 
customers intended to teach one how to maintain financial security and prevent identity theft 
resulting in potentially costly damages and fraudulent purchases to an owners’ accounts.  This 
education has helped raise awareness and consciousness about the prevailing issue of identity 
theft and card fraud.  More recently, a number of news reports have aired raising awareness to 
the public as well.  However, in today’s technologically advanced global society of economics—
readily accessible to the criminal—it  appears this type of self-guardianship is not sufficiently 
adequate, leaving a tremendous deficit of capable guardianship of one’s own identity, as well as 
one’s own financial information and security.   
Intertwined Problem of Identity Theft 
The severity of credit card fraud cannot be properly understood without first having a 
thorough understanding of identity theft.  Identity theft, which acts a predecessor to plastic card 
fraud, has quickly become “the most prevalent financial crime in the United States” (White & 
Fisher, 2008, p. 3).   Identity theft can occur on various levels including individual offenders, co-
offenders, and organized crime group offenders.  Identity theft can be defined as the unlawful 
use of another’s personal identifying information whether it be name, address, social security 
number, government passport number, driver’s license number, biometric information, bank 
account or credit card account information in attempt to gain access to services or finances with 
criminal intent (Allison et al., 2005, p. 19).  Various criminologists propose different theories to 
explain the crime of identity theft, which will be discussed in the following section.  Professor 
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Robert Clarke (1994) developed the current theory of human identification to explain the crime 
of identity theft and defined it as “the association of data with a particular human being” 
(LoPucki, 2001, p. 95).  Clarke (1994) applies his definition of human identification theory as a 
comprehensive overview of why humans choose to use another persons’ data to identify 
themselves.  However, other researchers have explained it in different ways.  The following 
section will describe criminology theories that others have used to explain the convoluted crimes 
of identity theft and financial fraud: 
Empirical Studies and Research Theories Explaining Identity Theft   
Relatively, little empirical research has been done on “the prevalence of the crime, its 
clearance rate by arrest, or the demographic characteristics of the victims and the identifiable 
offenders,” but criminologists from the University of South Florida and University of Illinois at 
Chicago reported that the typical apprehended offender was “African American, female, 
unemployed, working alone, and was unknown to the victims,” who tended to be White males 
(Allison et al., 2005, p. 19).  An important attempt to explain this type of individual offence with 
a routine activities approach is the study of Osgood et al. (1996), which argues that the 
motivation to deviate emerges from situations where the deviance is “symbolically and tangibly 
rewarding” (Osgood et al.,1996 as cited in Bernburg & Thorlindsson, 2001, p. 547).  Applying 
this theoretical expansion to explain these typical identity theft offenders in a society that is 
wrecked with racist hate crimes and White male supremacy, it is not difficult to understand how 
a Black female could become motivated to choose a White male victim as a suitable target for 
offense.  After all, it is the White males of the American society that represent the majority of 
politicians, police and judges who send disproportionate amounts of African American males to 
prison, leaving behind many Black females to financially support their children in the absent 
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fathers’ places.  By attacking White males as suitable targets, the African American females are 
not only finding revenge by robbing these men of their identities, but also doing so in a very 
“symbolic and rewarding” way—both psychologically and financially.    
Two other researchers, Heith Copes and Lynne Veiraitis, from the University of Alabama 
at Birmingham and the University of Texas at Dallas respectively, jointly conducted two separate 
studies on the bounded rationality of identity thieves and the use of the neutralization theory for 
interrogations of identity thieves (Copes & Veiraitis, 2009; Copes, Veiraitis, & Jochum, 2007).  
The first of their two studies was conducted in 2007 using the techniques of neutralization 
theory, which lists five specific techniques:  (1) denial of responsibility, (2) denial of injury, (3) 
denial of the victim, (4) condemnation of the condemners, and (5) appeal to higher loyalties 
(Sykes & Matza, 1957 as cited in Lilly et al., 2011, p. 103).  Using data from 59 federally 
convicted identity thieves, they provide illustrations of how information can be used to “develop 
functional themes” for police Reid interrogation procedures.   Their study attempts to bridge the 
gap between theory and application by helping the police interviewers understand the mindset of 
the identity thieves and justifications used by them both prior to the crime and after the event in 
efforts of obtaining confessions by guilty suspects.  Their sample included offenders from ages   
23 to 60 years old, with 18 White females, 16 African American females, 2 Asian females, 8 
White males, and 15 African American males (Copes et al., 2007, p. 452).  Again, there is a 
dominant pattern of African Americans, both male and female, disproportionately represented to 
Whites, in this sample of convicts.  Overall, 35 of these offenders used a minimum of one 
neutralization technique while 14 used multiple techniques.   The most frequent techniques that 
these identity thieves mentioned were:  “denial of injury (n=21), appeal to higher loyalties 
(n=14), denial of victim (n=9), and denial of responsibility (n=6)” (Copes et al., 2007, p.452).     
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One of the most common statements made by the offenders was “I always thought that 
just because it was a white collar crime it didn’t hurt nobody,” as they tried to deny causing any 
real harm from stealing a person’s identity and credit, while justifying themselves and 
neutralizing the act itself (Copes et al., 2007, p.452 ).  Others brazenly stated that “Everything 
that I did was based on grabbing the identity and then opening separate accounts.  It affected 
them, but it was different,” (Copes et al., 2007, p. 453).  Different in what way, others might ask?  
Researchers soon discovered that inside these identity thieves’ criminal minds, it was easy to 
justify victimizing a faceless, plastic card.  Identity thieves argue that the “only people that 
actually lose from their crimes are banks, corporations, and other deserving victims,” (Copes et 
al., 2007, p. 453).   The identity thieves claim it is only a minor hassle to the victims, and 
unauthorized charges can be easily dropped with a few phone calls, warranting reimbursement 
by the bank to the victim (Copes et al., 2007, p. 453).  As one anonymous offender said it:   
Intentionally screw someone over…I couldn’t do it... but corporations, banks, 
police departments, government—oh, yeah, let’s go get ‘em.  Because that’s the 
way they treat you, you know what I’m saying.  If they done screwed me over, 
screw them. (as cited in Copes et al., 2007, p. 453)    
Little do these offenders realize that the costs of their crimes are passed from the banks and 
corporations to the customers in forms of higher prices, higher interest rates and taxpayer funded 
government bailout assistance programs for re-imbursements.  As a result, all people bear the 
costs, including the offenders as consumers and taxpayers.  Another offender claimed:   
I did it for my son.  I thought if I had money and I was able to live, have a nice 
place to live, and not have to worry about a car payment, I could just start a new 
life and that life is for him. (as cited in Copes et al., 2007, p. 453)    
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This statement could likely have been made by one of the African American females in the group 
of offenders, who as previously described in Allison et al.’s 2005 study, targeted White males to 
steal identity in vengeance, as she faced the financial crisis of raising her child alone as a 
struggling single parent, in the absence of his father in prison.  For single parents, it is easy to 
comprehend that desperate times can call for desperate measures, and caring mothers will do 
almost anything to provide for their child.  However, if a mother takes irrational risks by 
committing crime and landing herself in prison, it shows very poor rationale:   The child is now 
left alone suffering two absent parents, instead of only one absent father.  This concept of 
rationale leads to the next study of bounded rationality of identity thieves.   
   In 2009 Copes and Vieraitis explored how offenders’ experiences affected their rational 
assessments of risks versus rewards in a cost benefit analysis, which in turn facilitated their 
decision to engage in identity theft as an easy, rewarding and a “relatively risk-free way” of 
funding their lifestyles (Copes & Vieraitis, 2009, pg. 237).  By gaining the offenders’ 
perspectives and analyzing them through a theoretical rational choice framework (Cornish & 
Clarke, 1986), researchers were able to understand what factors influenced their criminal 
motivations (see also Clarke & Cornish, 2001).  Rational choice theory, fitting hand in hand with 
routine activities theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979), and provides solid infrastructural framework to 
support the leg of the triangle that represents the motivated offender.  Copes and Vieraitis 
discuss the various laws which have been enacted since the 1990s, including the Identity Theft 
Assumption and Deterrence Act (1998), the Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act (2004), the 
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act known as FACTA (2003), as well as the National 
Fraud Alert system—an offspring creation of FACTA. According to these researchers’ 
perspective, all of the laws mentioned above have been applications of routine activities theory:   
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 Most current legislation is directed toward creating or strengthening existing consumer 
protection laws and is based upon the assumption that potential offenders will be deterred 
by increased guardianship over targets or the threat of steeper penalties if caught.  (Cope   
& Vieraitis, 2009, p.241)   
In the same vein of routine activities and rational choice theories, their research revealed the 
primary and suspected motivation for offenders instigating identity theft was, of course, the 
desire for money (Cope & Vieraitis, 2009, p. 245).  As one offender put it, “It’s all about the 
money.  If there ain’t no money, it don’t make no sense” (as cited in Cope & Vieraitis, 2009, p. 
245). Therefore, money is the driving force behind most economic crimes, including identity 
theft and credit card fraud.  For many of the offenders, the research interviews revealed that 
identity theft was an easy way of getting quick cash and “getting high” for those centered on 
self-indulgence (Cope & Vieraitis, 2009, p. 246).  Other rational choice presented by the 
offenders was that of making profitable use of their employee positions of guardians over 
another person’s sensitive personal and account information either misusing it themselves or 
selling it to others illegally for profit.  They conclude their study with principles of situational 
crime prevention methods that could send deterrence messages at the point of sale, or scene of 
the crime by reducing the attractiveness of the suitable target.  Also, they discuss promotional 
support of public campaigns designed to create an impression that law-enforcement agencies 
consider identity theft, and therefore credit card fraud, a serious crime that promises to be 
prosecuted to the fullest extent (Copes & Vieraitis, 2009, p. 250-258).  This study strongly 
supports the idea of deterrence based situational crime prevention with convergence of space and 
time, motivated offenders, suitable targets and lack of guardianship as identified by routine 
activities theory.   
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Other more recent studies by Australian researchers from the School of Business at  
Queen’s University and University of New South Wales, report contrasting findings to those 
discussed above (Free & Murphy, 2014, p.1-41).  In their personal interviews and study of 37 
convicted felons of fraud related to identity theft, results showed that many of these types of 
crimes are not predicated upon solo-offending, but rather on co-offending (Free & Murphy, 
2014, p. 1-41).   This co-offending pattern can also be explained by routine activities theory in 
the social context by  “opportunities that arise in everyday life,” emphasizing that the socio-
structural patterns of people’s routine activities can bring together, or converge, motivated 
offenders—rather than just one single offender—with suitable targets lacking capable guardians 
(Bernburg & Thorlindson, 2001, p. 543-560).  While Cohen’s and Felson’s (1979) routine 
activities theory is applied to explain co-offending in this social context, others could explain co-
offending by applying Sutherland’s (1949) differential association theory.  Differential 
association relates one’s opportunity to commit crime to whom one regular associates with 
socially, and by whom cultural transmission is attributed.  This theory explains the opportunity 
of gaining access and knowledge of ‘how’ to commit a specific crime, such as identity theft and 
credit card fraud.    
Whether it be differential association theory (Sutherland, 1949), techniques of 
neutralization (Sykes & Matza, 1972), low self-control (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990), or rational 
choice theory (Cornish & Clarke, 1986), it is obvious that mainstream criminology has tended to 
focus on the offenders rather than the criminal events and criminal activities themselves, as can 
be understood and appreciated by the research described above.  However, Cohen and Felson 
(1979) take a different approach by not necessarily trying to discover the special characteristics 
of offenders, but rather the identifying circumstances that facilitate the criminal event.  This 
approach makes prevention of crime potentially more implementable.  It is this approach that 
49 
 
also explains a wide array of crime architectures, including organized crime rings, which have 
been found to commit massive amounts of identity thefts and credit/debit card fraud (Baldwin, 
2002, p. 8).     
According to Netherland law researchers, Edward Kleemans, Melvin Soudijn, and Anton 
Weenink, organized crime research shows that some offenders have quite normal characteristics 
as individuals—although, they are involved in serious crimes.  These researchers concur with the 
routine activities approach to solving organized crime.  In an article entitled, “Organized crime, 
situational crime prevention and routine activity theory,” seven papers “in which ideas on 
situational crime prevention and routine activity theory are applied to issues of organized crime 
and terrorism,” (Kleemans et al., 2012, p. 89).  All the papers were prepared by researchers for 
the Dutch National Police Agency and were presented during a meeting with Ron Clarke of 
Trends in Organized Crime (Kleemans et al., 2012, p. 89).  Each paper’s special topic discussed 
various types of organized crime applying the routine activity approach.  One paper revealed 
how willing offenders can and do outwit capable guardians (Huisman & Jansen, 2012, as cited in 
Kleemans et al., 2012, p. 89).  It also discussed the convergence of trailer park settings, making 
the group characteristics of social bonds, reputation and culture of silence all instrumental in 
creating a void where there is no capable guardian.  The void was protected by psychological 
barriers further preventing any effective guardianship from developing.  It is within this same 
context, yet different environment that organized Asian, Latino and African organized crime 
rings of identity thieves and credit card fraudsters maintain their void of capable guardians.      
Soudijn and Zegers focused their paper on another issue that is highly relative to 
organized identity theft and credit card fraud.  Their research paper discussed how cybercrime 
and virtual offenders, who commit fraud online, converge in physical settings such as local tough 
bars to share information as mutual offenders of the same organizational crime ring.  By 
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reviewing 150,000 posting by 1,846 members, researchers discovered that “hacking accounts and 
stealing money is not their biggest problem:  the main risk is not leaving traces when wiring the 
money into other accounts,” (Soudijn & Zegers as cited in Kleemans et al., 2012, p. 90).  The 
virtual world of internet organized crime rings makes the concept of space much different than 
the physical world.  It offers much more barriers and darkness from exposure, while creating the 
ultimate void of capable guardianship.  It also allows offenders from different parts of the world 
to ‘meet,’ ‘rate each other,’ and continue business bilaterally, while they remain completely 
shielded from the authorities; in this way, they are able to find suitable co-offenders (Soudijn & 
Zegers as cited in Kleemans et al., 2012, p. 90).  Finding suitable co-offenders has a snowballing 
effect creating large organized crime rings that have a tremendously damaging effect on stealing 
identities in mass quantities, as well as stealing money from numerous accounts in exorbitant 
amounts.  Here is an excellent example of how routine activities theory is applied to explain the 
extreme absence of capable guardianship online from hackers who steal identity and credit card 
information.  Hence, the papers presenting these special organized crime issues underline the 
necessity to move beyond the traditional ‘crime triangle’ of motivated offenders, suitable targets, 
and the absence of capable guardians, and expand this theory conducting further empirical 
research (Felson & Clarke, 2012, as cited in Kleemans et al., 2012, p.91).  
Effects of Identity Theft on Card Users  
Although identity theft consists of three different types:  financial, nonfinancial, and criminal 
record—financial identity theft accounts for the largest portion of these three and warrants great 
concern for implementing capable guardianship—with losses continually rising from the $2.3 
billion estimate reported by the U.S. General Accounting Office in 2002 (Allison et al., 2005, p. 
19).  In 2003 alone, more than 10 million cases were reported (Gerard, Hillison, & Pacini, 2004 
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as cited in White & Fisher, 2008, p. 3).  Within the previous 5 years prior to this report, 27 
million Americans reportedly had been victims of identity theft (White & Fisher, 2008, p. 3).  
Methods used to commit identity theft range from low-tech methods to high-tech methods and 
include thefts of wallets, purses, dumpster diving, hacking into databases and personal accounts 
online using viruses or decoding techniques, and more prominently by using specialized 
equipment (Barker et al., 2008, p. 402-404; White & Fisher, 2008, p.3).  In computer-related 
identity theft, the offender may be in another part of the state, country or the world (White & 
Fisher, 2008, p. 8-15).  This is a perfect example of how an absence of capable guardianship over 
various people located in different parts of the world, but functioning within an online cyber 
world and targeting victims to fraud from other remote locations of the globe, creates massive 
opportunities for identity theft and credit card fraud online.  This is all accredited to the absence 
of capable guardianship concept of routine activities theory.  This will be discussed further in a 
subsequent section.  Hence, most methods of identity theft are not amenable to police 
suppression efforts, which condition further exacerbates and demonstrates an absence of formal 
guardianship and legal protection over an individual’s identifying account information before 
becoming victimized (White & Fisher, 2008, p.4).  Laws enacted, that have been previously 
mentioned, deal primarily with deterrence and aftermath of fraud, and only yield mild 
preventions of true security and protection from attack.  Devices, such as skimmers, are used for 
stealing legitimate credit card information. Additionally, there is equipment for making 
counterfeit credit cards, which is readily available to anyone who wishes to make a small 
investment to beat the system (Barker et al., 2008, p. 400-401).  The prices range between $300-
$500 for skimmer devices and $5,000-$10,000 for equipment to manufacture fake credit cards 
(Barker et al., 2008, p. 401).  Unfortunately, “there have not been any laws or legislation put in 
place against the skimming and counterfeit card devices,” (Merchant Account Blog 2006 as cited 
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in Barker et al., 2008, p. 403).    More recently, since the new EMV chip technology has been 
encrypted into cards, there has been the underground development and sale of “shimmers,” 
which are capable of reading EMV chips. 
The Challenge of Capable Guardianship  
The question posed to the reader:  How can one effectively and solely ‘guard’ bank 
accounts and credit card property sufficiently any longer in a world rapidly and continuously 
advancing in technologies?  Although laws, policies and new security features, including the 
EMV chip technology, have been enacted to act as guardians, is it feasibly possible?  It is 
strongly suggested that none of these precautions can entirely stop identity theft and card fraud, 
nor effectively deter and curtail it significantly.  There yet remains an overwhelming absence of 
capable guardianship—and surprisingly at in-store POS terminals during card in hand face to 
face transactions with merchant employees—places believed to be the least risky sales venue by 
most credit card companies.  This phenomenon can best be explained by routine activity theory 
(Cohen & Felson, 1979) which was first developed by criminologists Marcus Felson and 
Lawrence Cohen using a triangular model, which represents the convergence of three essential 
ingredients necessary for crime to take place—motivated offenders, suitable targets, and an 
absence of guardianship (see also: Felson, 1995, 2002, 2006; Felson & Boba, 2010; Felson & 
Clarke, 1998).  Bernburg and Thorlindsson (2001, p. 544-549) report that several attempts have 
been made to study “routine activities with individuals as the unit of analysis” and these studies 
support the hypothesis that deviant events are more likely to occur when routine activities, such 
as simply using one’s credit card on a routine basis for purchases, increase the convergence of 
time, space, absent guardianship, availability of suitable targets, and motivated offenders 
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Hewson, 1996; Lasley, 1989;  Massey et al., 1989; Miethe et al., 1987; Mustaine & Tewksbury, 
1998a, 1988b, 1988c; Osgood et al., 1996; Sampson & Woolredge, 1987).  
In the absence of sufficient guardianship needed to protect one’s identifying information, 
counterfeiting cards are going to continue to become a growing problem according to Katherine  
Barker, Jackie D’Amato and Paul Sheridon—researchers at the College of Business, University 
of South Florida (Barker et al., 2008, p. 406).    Since the effect of fraud costs not only the 
victims, but also the entire system of banks, merchants and credit card companies, various fraud 
programs have been implemented for deterrence and detection by the same.  The guardianship 
efforts have expanded from the sole responsibility of the individual and shifted to a broader 
system of government through laws, and businesses through protective designs.   Visa, American 
Express and MasterCard have developed and added more elaborate physical features to 
legitimize credit cards.  These features have in the past included holograms, fine-line printing, 
and ultra-violet pink to reveal the credit card company’s logo under special lighting, thus making 
duplication more difficult—but not impossible.  Additionally, programs geared toward verifying 
legitimate card ownership were launched by implementing CVV codes within the magnetic 
strips of the cards.  When the card is used at the point of sale, an encrypted CVV code is read by 
the POS terminal and transmitted to the issuing bank where the code is verified. This method is 
also an attempt to provide more adequate guardianship over the account, and was designed to 
protect users’ personal identifying and credit/bank card information.  Howbeit the method has 
not succeeded in eliminating fraud. Much to everyone’s dismay, these guardianship efforts 
promulgated by credit card companies offered only small victories.  Cardholders were ever-
increasingly inundated and trumped by fraudsters with the aforementioned skimming devices, 
which can read the magnetic strip, as well as the CVV code on the back of the card, and capture 
all the necessary verifiable information (Barker et al., 2008, p. 404).  The newest EMV chip 
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technology in the process of implementation within the United States is carrying great 
expectations that it will tremendously help in curtailing the crimes of identity theft and card 
fraud.  However, many registers at stores are not equipped to handle these transactions yet, 
despite the liability shift that took place, October 1, 2015.  The EMV model taken from the 
European chip encrypted cards in Europe and the United Kingdom requires both the chip and a 
PIN number to be used for purchases.  However, this is not the case within the U.S. where even 
those companies that have transitioned over to the chip reader do not yet regularly require a PIN 
number for the card transaction to be completed as is demonstrated by this research in 
subsequent chapters.  That said, even PIN numbers assigned specifically to individual 
cardholders are able to be easily stolen, and this paper will soon reveal how.  The overall picture 
is that there continues to be a great absence of capable guardianship, and the word to focus on 
here is “capable.”   
 For instance, a capable guardian in a retail store setting is one that takes all necessary 
precautions and steps as outlined by the merchant contract agreement and guidelines of properly 
checking for an authorized signature on the back of each consumer’s card during face to face 
card in hand transactions.  He or she also requires that the consumer sign the card in his or her 
presence if the card is blank and unsigned.  Subsequently the capable guardian will follow up 
with requesting government issued photo identification bearing a genuine signature and will then 
make general visual comparisons for similarities or differences between the two signatures.  
Additionally, he or she will be actively engaged and aware of suspicious consumer behaviors, 
such as those outlined by Visa in their “Card Acceptance Guidelines for Visa Merchants” (2015, 
p. 35).  Europe nor the United Kingdom massively utilizes the electronic signature capturing 
devices that the United States uses for signatures for in store POS transactions, so there is not a 
reliance upon these devices for security measures as there is in the United States.  Most 
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merchants and employees largely use the old fashioned way of each individual employee 
visually comparing each handwritten signature of each card purchaser during each transaction 
and requiring government issued photo identification—and they do so somewhat consistently no 
matter what the specific business establishment genre.  This was discovered by this researcher 
during travels for an independent study within England and France in the months of May-June, 
2014. 
The Places a Consumer is at Risk 
Based upon the routine activities theory and this principle precedence of the absence of 
capable guardianship, efforts have been made by online businesses to warn consumerist 
cardholders.  Special warning is giving to those who have false sense of security and feel safer 
using their bank debit card versus their credit card for transactions.  Educating the consumer 
about the places which pose the greatest risk and why, Bankrate.com discourages using one’s 
bank debit card at four specific places known for victimization (http://www.bankrate.com).  
These four places include large department store chains, outdoor ATMs and outdoor pay-at-the-
pump gas terminals, restaurants, and the World Wide Web (http://www.bankrate.com).  The 
reasoning behind this rationale is that most of these places lack appropriate guardianship, thus 
making them a great suitable target for motivated offenders.  Fraudsters can slip around in the 
dark to these hot spots for crime, place skimming devices over the real card slots at ATMs and 
other terminals such as these, and steal a mega amount of information in a short time.  This 
makes one’s risk for identity theft and credit card fraud extremely high 
(http://www.bankrate.com). “If the public has access to it, then someone has the ability to add 
skimming devices to it, position cameras on it and position themselves in a way where they can 
surveil it,” (Bell, 2014 as cited online at http://www.bankrate.com).    
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Outdoor terminals. For instance, someone can sit from inside a car across the street with 
their laptop and antenna receiving and downloading all the pertinent information needed for 
debiting and draining one’s account before the victim ever makes it home.  By using small 
cameras to capture footage of debit card users, while they are entering their personal 
identification number, or PIN, the fraudster is gaining free access to the victim’s money 
(http://www.bankrate.com).  He or she inherently triumphs over the rightful guardianship and 
authority of the cardholder and bank, while wrongfully assuming the guardianship role of the 
account themselves by interception. Victimization of both the bank and the unaware card holder 
occurs as a result.  This describes one of the many ways that cardholders can become victims of 
credit/debit card fraud while still holding their card in hand.  All outdoor credit/debit card 
terminals make the legitimate cardholder an open target and unknowingly leave them vulnerable 
to attack. According to this website, one is much better off using terminals inside retail outlets or 
other high-trafficked, well-lit places (Bell, 2014 as cited online at http://www.bankrate.com).  
These places offer guardianship in the way of plenteous customers passing by, and by dispelling 
darkness so that a fraudster is less capable of hiding himself and his equipment.  As one moves 
through each phase of identity theft and credit/bank card fraud, one can better realize and 
appreciate the routine activities theoretical underpinning, which best explains this phenomenon 
and how the necessary guardianship concept continues to be problematic (Cohen & Felson, 
1979).    
Restaurants.  Another dangerously risky place to use one’s bank debit cards it at 
restaurants.  This is due specifically to the lack of capable guardianship over one’s card when it 
is being processed.  It is common procedure for wait staff to take one’s card, usually nestled 
within a black vinyl pouch with one’s bill, away from the table and therefore away from the 
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oversight and guardianship of the owner of the card.  Once out of sight, the card can be secretly 
skimmed on equipment and the entire customer’s credit information is therefore saved for 
identity theft and financial fraud.  If one is paying with a bank debit card versus a credit card, 
this can be even more risky because the wait staff/fraudster can drain the account in one lump 
sum before the customer ever leaves the building.  Due to the high frequency of this 
phenomenon, some restaurant owners have invested in newer equipment that allows the wait 
staff to process the plastic card payment directly at the table and completely in the view of the 
customer card owner.  This whole concept is based strictly upon the routine activities theory, 
allowing the customer to maintain capable guardianship over their card and account by keeping 
the transactions out in the open and not behind closed doors somewhere else in the restaurant.  It 
is apparent in this illustration that the absence of capable guardianship, converging with the 
opportunity in time and space giving direct access to the customer’s card, allows motivated (and 
usually low wage earning waitresses/waiters) ample access and opportunity to commit crimes of 
credit/debit card fraud.   “Would you care for a side of credit or debit card fraud with your 
meal?” is a question that wait staff does not ask the customer, but probably should.  In an 
interview, McGoey stated that any place where the credit card is out of hand can increase 
chances of fraud:  “The guy comes to your table, takes your card and disappears for a while, so 
he or she has privacy”....giving the person plenty of time to copy your card information 
(http://www.bankrate.com).  
 Online.  Another illustration of how routine activities theory is effectively applied to 
explain identity theft and credit/debit card fraud is the relationship between the online cyber 
world of e-commerce and the potentially damaging effects of hacking, due to absence of capable 
guardianship.  Online is the number one place that people should not use their credit or debit 
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cards, according to the previous source cited.  There are multiple ways that data can be 
intercepted and compromised by invasive malware software of hackers, without the knowledge 
of the consumer—until long after the damage is done.  According to Hendi Yogi Prabowo, 
researcher for the Centre for Forensic Accounting Studies at Islamic University of Indonesia, 
“credit card fraud has become one of the most sophisticated crimes of the world” and that 
“global payments fraud statistics suggest that more must be done to address the problem” 
(Prabowo, 2011, p. 371).  Prabowo compiled studies using primary and secondary data from 
payment systems of the “USA, the UK, Australia and Indonesia to conduct historical and 
benchmarking analyses to highlight the trends in credit card fraud prevention in four countries,” 
(Prabowo, 2011, p. 371).   He explained these overall phenomena with the “crime triangle” of 
routine activity theory describing the three factors that allow crime to occur:  motivated 
offenders, suitable target and absence of capable guardianship (Prabowo, 2011, p. 371).   
In his article entitled “Building our defense against credit card fraud:  a strategic view,” 
he references Clarke’s proposal that growth and technology has created new crime opportunities 
(Clarke, 2004, p. 55 as cited in Prabowo, 2011, p. 372).  Using routine activity theory (Cohen & 
Felson, 1979) the author describes how another criminology theorist, Yar (2005), suggests that 
online crime  expands the terrestrial concept of suitable targets to a whole new complexity that is 
significantly different in “value, inertia, visibility, and accessibility” measuring it with a concept 
called VIVA (Yar, 2005, . 424 as cited in Prabowo, 2011, p. 372).  Of these suitable targets for 
online crime, those include the card not present ones.  With a changing environment for remote 
purchases and cashless society, electronic commerce is replacing an immense number of real 
world transactions with virtual world purchases.  Other theorists, Newman and Clarke (2002), 
propose that these motivated online offenders are driven by “criminogenic attributes of 
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information systems” known as SCAREM (as cited in Prabowo, 2011, p. 372).  SCAREM is an 
acronym that stands for stealth, challenge, anonymity, reconnaissance, escape and multiplicity.  
Newman and Clarke propose that the offenders have overwhelming desire to beat the system, 
being sneaky and secretive and find that online environment offering great anonymity and thus 
“deception is everywhere” [online] (as cited in Prabowo, 2011, p. 373).  Escaping the scene of 
the crime is easy for the online offender and avoiding detection (“reconnaissance”).  This ease 
allows for quick and easy multiplication of the offences.   
For example, when a hacker managers to steal a bank’s customer account 
information he may then use such information to facilitate the commission of 
other crimes such as extorting money from the bank for the return of the database. 
(Newman & Clarke, 2002; Newman & McNally, 2005, p. 42, as cited in Prabowa, 
2011, p. 37)  
New crimes emerge from the original crimes of stealing identities and credit/debit bank card 
accounts and they are all supported by the crime triangle of the routine activities theory (Cohen 
& Felson, 1979).  The absence of capable guardianship, along with virtual world suitable targets, 
makes for a fertile environment for breeding online bank account crimes.  The online world is 
now a predominant crime scene for convergence of the victim and offender, yet not in space, but 
within a network of the internet systems or perhaps the mail/package delivery system.  Reyns 
(2010, p. 58) further explains how the motivated offenders and suitable targets do not have to 
even converge online at the same time, but can be at different times (as cited in Prabowo, 2011, 
p. 373).  This expands routine activities theory even further eliminating the element of 
simultaneous ‘time’ in order for crime to occur.   
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In addition to this, the online environment creates great challenges for law enforcement to 
effectively establish guardianship.  According to some criminology theorists, the success of 
guardianship depends primarily on the guardian’s co-presence with the potential target and the 
potential offender at the same time and place (Yar 2005, p. 423 as cited in Prabowo, 2011, p. 
373; Tseloni et al., 2004, p. 74).  Yar argues that in relation to cybercrime maintaining a social or 
physical co-presence is ultimately almost impossible because the offender is highly mobile and 
his or her online activities are temporary and irregular, and thus warrants a need for adaption of 
the concepts and practices of guardianship to cope with the new environment (as cited in 
Prabowo, 2011, p. 373).  Using certain analytic programs, some applications of industrial 
strength analytics have been employed across a wide variety of activities by certain credit card 
companies and banks in attempts to detect, or police, online financial fraud.    Authors Bolton 
and Hand of the Institute of Mathematical Studies offered a comprehensive review of how 
technological advances using mathematical methodologies can be used to detect fraud once 
prevention, or presence of capable guardianship, has failed (Bolton & Hand, 2002, p. 235).  In 
addition to this statistical fraud detection defense tactic, the US, the President’s Identity Theft 
Task Force (2007) issued a strategic plan in April 2007 to tackle the surmounting problem of 
identity theft and financial frauds in America.  Other countries have been attempting to 
coordinate efforts also (Prabowo, 2011, p. 381).  Efforts to effectively protect and guard people 
from identity theft and credit/debit bank card fraud has been underway for more than a decade, 
yet the absence of truly capable guardianship causes this online environment for fraud crimes to 
prevail.  Online fraud victimization has been contributed to low self-control theory (Gottfredson 
& Hirschi, 1990), since some levels of cooperation is often needed between the victim and the 
offender with the promise of goods, services or other benefits that may be nonexistent or that the 
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fraudster never intends to provide (Holtfretter, Reisig & Pratt, 2008, p. 190).   Other studies 
exploring the idea of computer crime victimization using other theories including routine 
activities theory:  Choi’s integrated theories and empirical assessments reported in the January-
June 2008 issue of International Journal of Cyber Criminology, (Choi, 2008); Reyns’ article 
published in Crime Prevention and Community Safety situational crime prevention approach to 
cyber stalking victimization and preventative tactics for internet users and online place managers 
using opportunity theory and (Clarke, 1992, 1997) situational crime prevention (Reyns, 2010, p. 
100); and Bossler and Holt’s online activities and malware infection and guardianship using 
routine activity theory to explore victimization of data loss of college students and computer 
deviant malware making them targets (Bossler & Holt, 2009,p. 400-420).  However, in the latter, 
both concurred that physical guardianship had little effect and that policy implications needed to 
decrease malware victimization in colleges could not focus on physical hardening (Bossler & 
Holt, 2009, p.400). 
 Retail stores.  The online environment for credit card fraud contrasts greatly with that of 
the physical retail store, yet credit card fraud prevails in these environments as well.  A review of 
consumer misbehaviors reported in Journal of Business Research (2004), discusses the profound 
impact of consumer misbehaviors and the effects it has on merchant employees within the retail 
store locations (Fullerton & Punj, 2002, p. 1239-1249).  In fact, ABC News reported that those 
misbehaviors have subsequently had an impact upon how retail stores, especially large 
department stores, such as Walmart, Target. BestBuy, JC Penny’s and Macy’s conduct their 
costs and benefits analyses, chalking much of their loss to credit card fraud at the costs of doing 
business (Fahmy, 2010 as cited online at http://abcnews.go.com) These stores seem to be highly 
targeted for suitability of victimizing due to various reasons:  1) they carry hot brands and 
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popular electronics that can easily be liquidated for quick cash via the Internet or on the street, 2) 
they also allow consumers to purchase in-store gift cards using credit or bank debit cards, and 3) 
they are “known for their wide selection of goods and anonymity” they offer shoppers 
(http://abcnews.go.com).  Most importantly, many large chains do not check customer cards for 
authorized signatures nor cardholder government issued picture identification bearing a genuine 
signature at point of sale terminals during checkouts.  Neither do they check signatures for even 
limited visual comparison, relying solely upon data captured by electronic signature pads for 
fraud detection.  This absence of POS checkout guardianship makes fertile soil for credit card 
fraud productions.  Motivated offenders know this and take full advantage of the opportunities 
that these large retail chain merchants offer them, making those stores extremely suitable targets 
for credit card crimes.  Here is an exemplary illustration of how routine activities theory applies 
to identity thieves utilizing someone else’s credit or bank debit card and getting away with the 
fraud crimes because no one is acting as a capable guardian at POS terminals.  There is a 
complete reliance upon new card securities, such as the EMV and e-pads to capture account 
information. As long as the payment is not declined, or a red flag does not go up alerting the 
employee that the card is stolen, then the consumer’s misbehaviors—in this case credit/debit 
card fraud—has no repercussions.  This reliance upon the electronic or digitized signature pad 
falsely replaces guardianship and can only help serve in fraud detection at a later point in time 
when the victim realizes charges to their accounts they did not make.  If the fraudster has used 
counterfeiting equipment to manufacture fake credit cards using another person’s active and 
viable account, then the event could be prevented if the POS employee would simply require 
cardholder picture identification at each transaction.  According to FBI Agent Slotter, large-scale 
counterfeiting operations have developed in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China, with smugglers 
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bringing in hologram materials into the US in California (Slotter, 1997, p.3).  These fraudsters 
prey on victims worldwide due to the absence of capable guardianship in obtaining valid account 
information, usually online or in organized crime rings, and then make counterfeit credit cards 
and go on shopping sprees buying huge amounts of name brand items for resell on the streets.  
No one knows who they are targeting for account information, but it is easy to see why they are 
targeting large retail chains at which to shop, which many are international corporations making 
overseas access viable.   
This research has involved in-store retail shopping with face-to-face transactions using 
four alternate cards in hand, to make both electronics and non-electronics related purchases in 
efforts to covertly investigate and observe the routine activities of cashiers with customers and 
potential fraudsters.  The ultimate observation has been to determine if each specific cashier 
acted as either a capable or non-capable guardian at the POS terminals within three specifically 
targeted large retail chain stores, which are coded for privacy reasons.  The goal was to gain 
understanding in search for particular themes or trends that are occurring causing the absence of 
capable guardianship at POS terminals within retail stores using the routine activities theory 
(Felson and Cohen, 1979).  The development and implementation of the EMV chip technology 
within the United States has created a huge transition within the retail store POS terminal 
checkout environment.  This researcher wished to observe first-hand how those changes were 
affecting merchants and their employees in daily routine activities of accepting credit or debit 
cards equipped with this new technology, and collectively analyze those observations to 
determine whether or not these merchants were being encouraged to act as capable guardians by 
adhering to the Visa and MasterCard guidelines set forth by the companies for card acceptance.  
Specifically, were the employees being required to adhere to the policy of securing identity at in-
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store face to face transactions at POS terminals equipped with the EMV readers?  What are the 
managers doing, if anything, to train their employees to check for proper authorized signatures 
and proper comparison of account numbers on the card versus that showing in the system? 
 Managers, acting as “super controllers” of these stores could thwart much fraud loss by 
requiring the cashiers to pro-actively assume the capable guardian role by offering employee 
incentives for fraud prevention, rather than simply writing off fraud loss as the cost of doing 
business.  A great example of how this is implemented is in an essay prepared by a loss 
prevention employee for Tops Appliance City, Inc. located in New Jersey and New York, USA.  
Barry Masuda, of Tops Appliance, used in intelligence data to train store managers and 
employees how to “differentiate between legitimate from illegitimate” cardholder transactions 
(Masuda, 1991, p. 121).  His efforts yielded a reduction of in-store credit card fraud from 
$1,121,000 in 1991 to $200,700 in 1992 by simple implementation of routine activity theory 
capable guardianship concepts (Cohen & Felson, 1979).  Other theorists have applied rational 
choice, situated action and social control of organizations to retail store fraud crimes and argue 
that priority should be placed upon safety and the “well-being of the workers, consumers and 
general public” making it more challenging for effective guardianship (Vaughan, 1998, p.23).  
Sampson and Eck argue, in contrast, that not only should managers and employees act as 
guardians, but also act as “super controllers” (2010, p. 37).  In their article, “Super controllers 
and crime prevention:  a routine activity explanation of crime prevention success and failure,” 
Sampson and & Eck raise awareness as to why people and organizations take (or fail to take) 
preventative action against crime (Bowers & Johnson, 2006; Laycock, 2006; Knutson, 2006 all 
as cited in Sampson & Eck, 2010, p. 37).  This article effectively expands routine activity theory 
(Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson, 2008) to “look at what influences people and organizations to 
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take crime prevention action” and conclude that “crime concentrations imply the systematic 
failure of at least one form of controller” (Sampson & Eck, 2010, p.47).  In other words, the 
crime of identity theft and credit and debit bank card fraud has continued to occur in certain 
environments, such as those of the large department stores, because there is massive failure to act 
as capable guardians or controllers of the environment, and make interception and prevention 
possible.   
Summary of Literature Review 
Based upon the review of material within this paper, there is an obvious need for redefining 
capable guardianship.  As demonstrated through various applications manipulating many 
elements of identity theft and credit and bank debit card fraud, it is equally obvious that R.A.T., 
or Routine Activities Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson, 2008; Felson & Clarke, 1998) is 
the most applicable criminology theory for explaining this phenomenon.  The absence of capable 
guardianship that evades and prevails over fraudulent financial transactions of these kinds needs 
serious study and research for future policy implications.  A dominant theme throughout the 
context of this research paper is that of incapable and/or absent guardianship allowing identity 
theft and credit card crimes to continue to grow by leaps and bounds, both within the cyber 
world and the real physical world.  Conquering this problem will require new methods of 
guarding information and transactions.  Identity theft and credit and debit card fraud abound 
despite the implementation of laws, policies and even new EMV chip technology.  The retail, 
restaurant and in-store face to face card in hand transactions are at optimal risks despite the 
merchants and employees’ ability to properly identify each card paying customer at POS 
terminals.  Observational field study research is warranted to discover causes as to why this 
phenomenon continues to occur.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Purpose of Research Restated 
 The purpose of this research is to investigate by first-hand field observations the absence 
or presence of capable guardianship at point-of-sale (POS) terminals within retail store chains 
that are known to be highly targeted for identity theft in conjunction with credit, debit or bank 
card fraud.  (See pages 61- 62 of this thesis).  A majority of bank cards bear the logo of either 
Visa or MasterCard.  Both Visa and MasterCard mandate certain rules and regulations to be 
followed by merchants and their employees as outlined by their merchant agreement contracts 
(See Appendices C & D).  Banks also have their own specific rules and regulations that are to be 
adhered to in order for the merchant to accept the card bearing the Visa or MasterCard logo for 
payment (See Appendix B). 
Specifically, these rules require that each card must bear the legal cardholder’s genuine 
signature on the back of the card within the signature strip that is located below the magnetic 
stripe and beside the security CVV code.  Either above or below each signature strip located on 
the back of each card, are the words that read, “AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE – NOT VALID 
UNLESS SIGNED” (See Appendix C).  Point-of-sale face-to-face transactions that occur within 
retail stores, with card in hand customers, are considered by both Visa and MasterCard to be the 
least risky transactions of all because the merchant’s employees have the opportunity to 
investigate the identity of the customers paying with a plastic card method, and are required to 
do so if the card is not signed.  The steps that the employees must follow at the POS terminal 
during the transaction are outlined by Bank Rules, Visa, and MasterCard (See Appendices B, C, 
& D for details).  This investigator believes that the responsibility of acting as a capable guardian 
67 
 
that is placed upon the merchant and its employees is one that is often neglected and dismissed, 
thus it is also a contributing factor to the increase of identity theft related to card fraud.    
Review of Research Questions Addressed and Hypotheses 
Specifically, the following questions were addressed and hypothesized: 
RQ1:  The first research question contains five parts:  1) Will the cashier at the point of 
sale transaction act as a capable guardian over the face-to-face transaction and act to help prevent 
identity theft and credit/debit card fraud by taking the card into his or her hand to visually check 
the back of the credit or debit card to see if it bears an authorized signature by the legal 
cardholder, or check the account number on the card and compare it to that in the system or 
receipt in according to the merchant agreement rules as mandated by the Bank Rules and 
Regulations, Visa and MasterCard?  (See Appendices B, C, & D).  Variables investigated:   
2) Will the variables of non-electronic versus electronic purchase increase levels of capable 
guardianship?  Will there be a difference in the level of capable guardianship if the purchase is 
made at the back electronic counter POS terminal versus the store’s front end POS terminal?  3) 
Will the amount of higher purchase charges to the card raise levels of guardianship at POS 
terminals with electronic purchases compared to a low levels of guardianship for small charges 
to the card?  4)  Will the variables of time segment of day or night and business or lack thereof 
give increase or decrease to the levels of capable guardianship?  5)  Will there be a difference of 
levels of guardianship based upon gender or race of the employee processing the transaction at 
each POS terminal? 
Ho1:  There will be an overall generalized absence of capable guardianship at the POS 
terminals during the face-to-face card in hand transaction, and the cashiers will not act as a 
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capable guardians over the card accounts in keeping with Bank Rules, Visa and MasterCard 
merchant agreement contracts in efforts to prevent identity theft.  They will not take the card in 
hand at any point during the transaction to specifically compare the account number listed on the 
face of the card to that showing in the system nor will the cashier specifically check the back of 
the card to see if it has been validated by an authorized signature.  Variable Hypotheses:            
2) There will be a slight to significant difference between levels of guardianship when the 
purchase is an electronics purchase versus a non-electronic purchase or whether the purchase 
was made at the store’s front end register or back electronic counter register.  3)  There will be a 
higher level of capable guardianship demonstrated by participants at POS terminals when the 
charges to the credit card are over $50 versus those under $50.  4)  There may be a slight 
difference in higher levels of guardianship depending upon the business of the store or lack 
thereof.    5)  There will be no difference if the cashier is male nor female, Black or White.  
Overall, there will be a generalized absence of capable guardianship at the POS terminals within 
each store chain by all participants, with higher levels of guardianship being demonstrated only 
by those participants processing electronics purchases. 
RQ2:  Will the cashier at the face-to-face transaction at the POS (point-of-sale) terminal 
require the cardholder and purchaser to sign the back of the unsigned card used for purchase, and 
will he or she make her show a government issued photo identification for verification of her 
identity before the transaction is allowed to be processed through, in keeping with merchant 
agreement rules as mandated by Bank Rules and Regulations, Visa and MasterCard? 
Ho2:  The cashier will not check the back of the card, and therefore, will not check for an 
authorized signature validated the card.  Consequently, the cashier will neither ask her to show a 
government issued photo identification document bearing her genuine signature for comparison 
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or verifying her identity before the transaction will be allowed to be processed through to its 
entirety.  Ultimately, it is hypothesized that the cashier will not abide by the Bank Rules and 
Regulations, the Visa merchant rules for accepting unsigned cards, nor the MasterCard rules for 
accepting unsigned cards (See Appendices B, C, & D for references).    
RQ3:  Will the cashier act in lieu of an FDE (Forensic Document Examiner) to 
investigate by visual comparison the general similarities or differences of handwriting 
demonstrated on the government issued photo identification bearing a genuine signature of the 
researcher to that of the unsigned card that should be required to be signed in the presence of the 
cashier at the POS terminal? 
Ho3:  The cashier will not check the back of the card, and therefore, will not check for an 
authorized signature validating the card; thus, he or she will neither attempt to ask the researcher 
to sign the back of the card nor show government photo identification bearing her genuine 
signature, nor will he or she act in lieu of an FDE to investigate by general visual comparison the 
general similarities or differences of the handwriting on the government issued identification to 
that of the signature on the back of the card per requested signature.  The cashier will not request 
a signature on the back of the card, and the only signature requested will be that prompted by the 
electronic signature capturing device at POS terminal.  
RQ4:  Will the cashier rely solely upon the electronic capturing device to verify the 
signature and not personally look at it himself or herself?  
RQ5:  Will the participant cashier at the POS terminal solely depend upon the EMC chip 
reader technology newly implemented at the POS terminals equipped with such to “guard” over 
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the identity of the cardholder, even when neither a PIN number nor signature is required nor 
requested for the transaction to be processed? 
Ho4 and Ho5:  The cashier participant processing the transaction will demonstrate heavy 
reliance upon the electronic signature capturing device, if a signature is required, and/or the 
EMV chip reader technology to “guard” over the face-to-face card in hand sales transaction at 
the POS terminal, whether a PIN is requested or required or not. 
Procedures for Collecting Data 
 Gaining access to each of the 28 stores has been achieved by searching the Internet and 
obtaining a computer generated list of these three chains’ store locations within the tri-states of 
Tennessee, Virginia, and North Carolina.  A narrower list has been accumulated be sectioning 
each state off into bordering regions and searching for store locations within those specific 
regions of Eastern Tennessee, Western Virginia, and Northeastern North Carolina and choosing 
those that were randomly located along the I-81, I-40, I-75, and I-26 interstate highways.  Stores 
were randomly selected for patronizing along each individual interstate highway.  Shopping 
dates consisted of a busy six day period from February 12 through February 17, 2016.  This was 
a long holiday weekend consisting of Valentines’ Day, Saturday, February 14th and President’s 
Day, February 16th. Data was collected by observational studies made during thirty-four (34) 
separate transactions at these twenty-eight (28) different store locations randomly selected for 
shopping.  The researcher alternated between purchasing an electronic related item and paying 
for it at a POS terminal located in the back of the store in the electronics department, and 
purchasing less expensive non-electronic items from the POS terminals located at the front of the 
department store. The purchase amounts ranged from$1.41 (food item) to $246.07 (LG Stereo).  
Receipts were saved and an observations report was filled out immediately upon leaving each 
71 
 
individual store and after each individual transaction occurred to collect and code certain data 
(See Appendix A).  The construction of the observations report is discussed further at the end of 
this chapter.  Ideas and evidence that supports hypotheses as to the absence or presence of 
capable guardianship existing at POS terminals at these specific department stores emerged from 
the field based upon the accumulative observational studies.    
Four separate plastic card payment methods were utilized by the researcher as the legal 
cardholder and consumer, but all of the signature strips on the backs of these four cards were 
entirely unsigned, therefore not valid to be used for purchases unless signed in the presence of 
the employee at the POS terminal.  Two of the cards bear the logo of Visa, while the other two 
bear the logo of MasterCard.  Two of the cards were encrypted with EMV chip technology but 
also had magnetic stripes; while the other two had security features of magnetic stripes and PIN 
numbers. In addition to observational data collected during thirty-four (34) separate face-to-face 
card in hand transactions at thirty-four separate POS terminals with thirty-four separate 
individual employees occurring within twenty-eight (28) different stores, basic demographics 
were also collected regarding the gender, race, and time segment of the day or night, including:  
6 am – 12 noon; 12 noon- 6 pm; 6 pm-12 midnight; 12-midnight – 6 am.  These variants were 
charted to help determine if there was a difference in the employees’ adherence to the store’s 
merchant agreement policy depending upon gender, race or the time of day each individual 
transaction occurred correlating with the business or lack of business inside the store.  
Store Chains and Coding 
 There were three individual national store chains selected for this research.  Two were 
chosen based upon their sales and easy access to both electronic products and non-electronics 
related items.  One was an electronics department store only, but sold inexpensive accessories 
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also. All three are large national chains predominantly located within the United States of 
America. Some of these chains are also located internationally and called by different names, 
although they are still owned by the associates of the same companies located within the U.S.  
All three store chains were also known to be reported as highly targeted for identity theft and 
card fraud.  To protect the privacy of each individual store chain and location and to prevent 
incrimination of individual employees of these three individual store chains, a coding system has 
been implemented. For this reason, the three chains have been coded as Store Chain #1, Store 
Chain #2, and Store Chain #3.  No specific information has been reported on the individual store 
names nor locations in the observations reports (See Appendix A). Locations have been coded 
within each individual state where each store was located and each transaction occurred, and the 
choices included those states within the region investigated:  Tennessee, North Carolina, 
Virginia or Georgia.   
Participants at POS Terminals 
 Furthermore, no personal identifying information has been collected on specific 
employees at POS terminals, nor has it been discussed in this research thesis.  Participants of 
these three individual store chains were required to be over the age of eighteen in order to be 
eligible for employment at each store, due to its being a national chain;   therefore, all 
participants at POS terminals were considered adults for research purposes.  The participants 
were randomly chosen by location of the POS terminal in which the purchase was being made, 
and the participant was working.  Thus, if the item was considered to be an electronics related 
item, then the researcher sought to process the transaction at the electronics POS terminal 
normally located in the back each store in the electronics department.  If the item purchased was 
considered to be a non-electronics related item, then the researcher sought out a POS terminal 
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located at the front of the store to process the face-to-face transaction.  The participants at the 
front POS terminals were chosen by randomly noting which terminal had the shortest line at the 
time the sales transaction occurred. The demographics of gender and race only of each 
participant were recorded on the Observations Report (See Appendix A).   
Purchases 
 Thirty-four (34) individual purchase transactions occurred at thirty-four (34) individual 
POS terminals.  The goal was to purchase as many non-electronics related items that were 
inexpensive and compare the observations to the near equivalent number of electronics related 
items purchased that were more expensive.  The purpose of this distribution was to observe the 
differences in the guardianship levels initiated by the participants at the POS terminals during 
each electronic or non-electronic related transaction.  Most electronic transactions have certain 
stipulations that require added security.  For example, electronics items must be returned within 
fourteen (14) calendar days versus the usual thirty to ninety days, as stated on receipts and as 
determined by each individual store chain policy.   
Electronic items are also highly targeted by identity thieves and fraudsters because they 
are high in demand and easy to liquidate either on the street or online, according to the statement 
of the problem and the research cited in the literature review of this thesis (See Ch. 1 & Ch. 2 for 
references). For this reason, some electronics items are placed within locked security cases or are 
locked down on the shelves with security cables, and require the assistance of a sales associate, 
who subsequently often acts as the cashier at the POS electronics terminal.  All of these 
measures are taken in efforts to help prevent stolen merchandise from leaving the merchant’s 
store.  It was hypothesized by this researcher that there would be higher levels of guardianship 
74 
 
by the participants at POS terminals located at the electronics counters  at the back  of each store 
specifically used for processing electronics related purchases (See Ho1).   
Payment Methods and Security Features of Cards Used 
 Four individual credit/debit cards were utilized for the thirty-four (34) individual 
transactions.  They were not used in equal distribution, but selected and used in unequally 
distributed proportions.  The reason being:  Two of these plastic payment cards were encrypted 
with the new security feature introduced into the U.S. based upon the European model of the 
EMV chip and pin technology.  The two other cards consisted of features of the magnetic stripes 
only as a method of being read for transaction processing. The researcher determined after 
visiting the first three stores in each one of the respective chains, that they were making or had 
already made the transition to technology equipped to read the EMV chip in the card.  That said, 
the researcher made the rational choice to primarily observe and test the guardianship levels of 
participants at POS  terminals equipped with the new readers as mandated by the EMV Liability 
Shift that occurred as of October 1, 2015 by Visa’s, MasterCard’s, American Express’s and 
Discover’s rules  (See p. 26-27 in Ch. 1’s Definition of Terms).  Since only two of her credit 
cards were encrypted with the new EMV chip card technology, she opted to utilize these for 
most purchases despite that they were both bearing the MasterCard logo.  The two bearing the 
Visa logo were utilized least, because neither were yet encrypted with the EMV chip technology. 
Construction of Observations Report 
 The construction of the observations report (See Appendix A) was based upon several 
criteria that were intended to be observed and recorded by the researcher during her field studies 
and transactions as an American card paying consumer. These criteria included the following:  1) 
the code for each store chain and state in which it was located, 2)  the time that actually 
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transaction took place coded into a category of one to four segmenting the twenty-four (24) hour 
cycle of each date, 3)  the demographics of gender and race only of each individual participant at 
each POS terminal transaction occurred, 4)  the location of each individual POS terminal 
specified in front of store for general purchases and in back of store for electronics related 
purchases, 5)  whether the item purchased in each transaction was electronics related or non-
electronics related, 6)  the amount of charges incurred on each specific card utilized for each 
transaction, 7)  the individual security features that were utilized by the technology equipped at 
each POS terminal, 8) the individual level of guardianship initiated by the participants 
processing the sales transaction at each POS terminal.  Additional information and notes were 
obtained and recorded if warranted by normal daily activities routine conversations occurring 
during the transaction process.   
 Coded Chain Store Location and Number (#) 
 Three specific national retail store chains were patronized for shopping with an 
accumulative totaling twenty-eight (28) individual store chains visited by the researcher as a 
consumer making face-to-face card in hand transactions.  Each store and location was coded as 
either being “Store Chain #1, Store Chain #2, or Store Chain #3,” for privacy purposes.  
Attempts were made to patronize each of the specific store chains #’s 1-3 in somewhat 
equivalent proportions, depending upon accessibility within each state in the region investigated.  
The location of each store was classified according to the state in which the business was 
located, and the choices were:  Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia.   
 Time Segments Transactions Occurred  
 Time segments were categorized as occurring within one of the following:  1) Segment 
1—meaning the transaction time fell between 6:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon, 2) Segment 2—
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meaning the transaction time fell between 12:00 noon and 6:00 p.m., 3)  Segment 3—meaning 
the transaction time fell between 6:00 p.m. and 12:00 midnight, or 4)  Segment 4—meaning the 
transaction time fell between 12:00 midnight and 6:00 a.m.  Exact times of transactions were not 
recorded in efforts to protect the cashier participants’ personal identifying information from 
being revealed as receipts record exact times and names of cashiers and/or numbers of exact POS 
terminals transactions occur.  All efforts were made to prevent any personally incriminating 
information to be reported on the observations report sheets (See Appendix A).  Meanwhile, 
times were categorized into quarterly segments to demonstrate any differences in levels of 
guardianship efforts made by POS cashiers during non-busy shopping hours as compared to busy 
shopping hours.  According to Visa’s Card Acceptance Guidelines for Visa Merchants rules 
located in Section 2:  Card-Present Transactions, merchants are to train their employees to be 
aware of card transactions made specifically right after the store opens and/or just before the 
store closes as these times tend to be when much fraud occurs (p. 35). This also indicates the 
store’s being busy or not busy.  Usually stores are not very busy as soon as the store opens or 
just before it closes as most customers do not patronize stores immediately upon opening nor 
closing.    
 Demographics of Participants at POS Terminals 
 The demographics of participants records only the gender and race of each cashier that 
processed each transaction.  The purpose of recording gender was to determine if there were 
differences in levels of guardianship dependent upon sex.  For example, if the cashier were a 
male versus a female, would natural guardianship instincts or efforts be greater, or vice versa.  
The purpose of recording race was determine if race was a contributing factor in awareness of 
identity theft and card fraud, and thus vigilance or lack of vigilance in practices of higher or 
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lower levels of guardianship at retail store POS terminals in efforts to prevent it.  One study cited 
earlier in this thesis in Chapter 2, Literature Review stated that Black African American women 
targeted White Caucasian males as victims (See pages 43-44 of this thesis).   
 Location of POS Terminal within the Stores 
 Each POS terminal location was recorded as either being located at the back of the store 
in the electronics department being located at the front of the store.  Back of store electronics 
POS terminals were utilized primarily for sales transactions involving electronics related items; 
while front of store POS terminals were utilized primarily for sales transactions involving non-
electronics related items.  Depending upon the time segment category in which the purchase was 
made, there was either adequate employees staffed to access both types of POS terminals, or 
only front of store POS terminals, if employee staff numbers were low during certain shopping 
hours.  The purpose in recording the POS terminal location as either back of store electronics or 
front of store general was to determine if there were differences in efforts and levels of capable 
guardianship by participants at each type of terminal, based upon training and requirements for 
those operating the POS terminals pertaining to electronics purchases compared to training and 
requirement for those operating POS terminals used for general non-electronic purchases.   
Electronic vs. Non-Electronic Items 
Each individual transaction was recorded as either being an electronics related item 
meaning it was sought out and obtained from the electronics department of the specific retail 
store, or it was recorded as being a non-electronics related item.  The purpose of recording 
whether the item purchased by card payment method was either electronics related or non-
electronics related was to determine the differences in guardianship efforts made during the face-
to-face card in hand in store sales transaction if the item was an electronics related item versus a 
78 
 
non-electronics related item.  According to the review of the literature cited in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis, electronic items are highly targeted by identity thieves and card fraudsters because these 
items are in high demand and are easily liquidated either on the streets or online (See page 62).   
It stands to reason that guardianship efforts would be assumed to be greater for electronic 
purchases, and it was hypothesized that they would be (See page 69).  In order to test this 
hypothesis, it was required to record whether each individual item was electronics related or 
non-electronics related.   
 Amount of Charges to Specific Card Used 
 The exact amount of each charge applied to each card account was recorded on the 
Observations Report for each individual transaction.  The purpose of recording each exact 
amount was to document any differences of efforts of guardianship providing the charges were 
higher in amount compared to lower in amount.  It was assumed and hypothesized that the 
higher charges would warrant higher levels of guardianship efforts by the participants at the POS 
terminals (Ho1).  The amount of the specific charge related to each individual face-to-face card 
in hand sales transaction was a determining criteria as to whether or not the system required the 
researcher as cardholder and purchaser to provide an electronic signature on the capturing 
device.  Retail stores often require a signature if the amount charged to the card is above a 
certain predetermined threshold.  Conversely, a signature is often not required by a system 
whose threshold is set below a certain predetermined amount charged to the card.  Charges were 
calculated accumulatively to each specific card made over the six (6) day shopping period.     
Card Being Used for Transaction and Coding 
A total of four individual credit/debit cards were utilized in unequal distribution for all 
accumulative transactions.  Reasons for unequal distribution of card use is discussed in depth in 
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the previous section entitled, “Payment Methods and Security Features of Cards Used,” (See 
pages 73-74).  Primary criteria recorded on the observations reports notated if the card itself bare 
either Visa’s or MasterCard’s logo, as these were the only two types accounts of which the 
researcher had legal ownership.  Two of the cards used were Visa, while the other two were 
MasterCard.  The two Visa cards were equipped with magnetic stripes only, while the two 
MasterCard cards were encrypted with magnetic stripes and EMV chip technology newly 
introduced into the US and able to be read by merchants who have made the transition to use 
POS terminals equipped with EMV chip readers, per the EMV liability shift requirement as of 
Oct. 1, 2015.   The researcher’s legal name and card account number, as well as expiration date 
were on the front of each card, along with the logo; and on the backs of each card were security 
CVV codes located next to the blank signature strips.  The researcher did not sign any of these 
four cards to make the cards “valid” for purchases as mandated by Visa and MasterCard rules 
and regulations:  “AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE – NOT VALID UNLESS SIGNED,” in bold 
capital letters above or below each unsigned signature strip (See Appendices C & D).  The 
security features of each card were noted on the observations reports as well as the specific card 
that was used.  However, the last four digits printed on each sales transaction receipt were 
renumbered for privacy purposes and coded as either ending in “1111,”  “2222,” “3333,” or 
“4444.”   
 Guardianship Efforts of Participant Employees  
 The questions asked on the observations report regarding the guardianship efforts of each 
individual participant employee at each POS terminal addressed the following :  1)  Did the 
cashier take the credit/debit card in hand to check anything at all, including but not limited to the 
account number or CVV code?  2)  Did the cashier notice and state that the card was not signed 
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to the researcher as card paying customer?  3)  If so, did the cashier ask her to sign the card in the 
cashier’s presence as mandated by merchant agreement contracts and bank rules (See 
Appendices B, C, & D).  4)  If the cashier requires the unsigned card to be signed in his or her 
presence, does he or she sequential ask the card signer, researcher and card paying customer to 
provide her government issued photo identification bearing her genuine signature for 
comparative purposes?  5)  If all those steps are followed properly, does the cashier demonstrate 
efforts to visually compare and contrast generally visible differences, in lieu of a trained FDE, 
between the newly signed signature located inside the signature strip on the back of the 
previously unsigned card to that of the genuine signature located on the government issued photo 
identification provided to the cashier?  6) Were there any additional guardianship efforts 
demonstrated by the cashier, such as calling for Code 10, if she believed there to be 
discrepancies or reasons to be suspicious of fraud (Based upon guidelines from MasterCard’s 
What If Fraud Happens, p. 1)?  Any additional efforts were noted in the blanks lines of 
“Additional” on the Observations Report (See Appendix A). 
Technology Used in Transactions 
The technology utilized for each transaction to be completed was recorded as follows:   
1) Did the system used at the POS terminal during the face-to-face card in hand sales transaction 
request for an electronic signature to be captured by the device?  2)  Did the system require the 
EMV chip reader to read the account information encrypted into the EMV chip on the card being 
used (if card used was equipped with EMV chip technology) or simply slide the magnetic stripe 
to read the account information?  3)  Did the system prompt for a PIN number to be input before 
the transaction could be completed?  4)  Did the cashier demonstrate by conversation the 
deference of guardianship to the EMV chip reader or to the electronic signature capturing 
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device?  If so, the words of the cashier were noted in the additional observations section, as 
described below.   
Additional Notes and Observations 
This section of the Observations Report consisted of blank lines to record any additional 
information observed or collected as data for research purposes.  This included but was not 
limited to normal conversations made during the daily routine activities of shopping, checking 
out, and paying with a credit or debit card.   If the participant cashier at the POS terminal offered 
any comments or statements during the transaction, specifically regarding the new EMV chip 
reader and technology, they were documented and reported in this section.  Any other 
information or observations the researcher believed to be pertinent to this study were also 
recorded in this section and analyzed for any recurrent themes or trends by accumulative 
comments representing recurrent ideology.   
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH FINDINGS  
A total number of twenty-eight (28) individual major department stores combined, 
located within Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia were patronized as a normal 
paying customer and observational studies were made during a total accumulation of thirty-four 
(34) point of sale purchase transactions with thirty-four (34) individual cashiers, involving the 
payment method of plastic credit/debit cards, with actual amounts ranging from the least 
expensive (food) purchase of $1.41 to the most expensive (LG stereo) purchase of $246.07.  The 
least expensive purchase of $1.41 was made at store chain #2 using a MasterCard credit card 
with chip technology without using a pin nor signature, while the most expensive purchase of 
$246.07 was made at store chain #3, using a different MasterCard credit card with chip 
technology and electronic signature only, with no pin number required.  These thirty-four (34) 
individual transactions were made over a six (6) day period from Friday, February 12, 2016 – 
Tuesday, February 17, 2016 using four (4) different major credit/debit cards, two of which were 
MasterCard and two of which were Visa.  None of these four major credit cards were signed with 
any mark or signature anywhere on the cards, by the legal cardholder and purchaser nor anyone 
else, specifically inside the white strips on the back of the cards provided above or below the 
captions on each stating, “AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE – NOT VALID UNLESS SIGNED.”   
A total combined amount of $1,730.48 was spent during this six (6) day shopping spree at 
twenty-eight (28) different stores within Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia, 
accumulating thirty-four (34) different sales transactions with thirty-four (34) different cashier 
participants within three (3) separate large department store chains that sell electronics—items 
commonly targeted for theft.  
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Distribution of Store Chains  
Table 1 
Region of Coded Store Chains Patronized for Observational Studies  
(28 Stores Visited in Total)  
Store Chain 
Code Number 
Tennessee North Carolina Virginia Georgia Total # of 
Stores Visited 
#1 11 2 1 1 15 (54%) 
      
#2 4 2 1 0 7 (25%) 
      
#3 3 2 1 0 6 (21%) 
      
All Stores 
Combined 
18 
(64%) 
6 
(21%) 
3 
(11%) 
1 
(4%) 
28 
(100%) 
 
Distribution of Participants  
The researcher selected participant stores from each one of the three major chains of high 
volume sales department stores for observational studies during purchases, based upon the 
convenience and accessibility of the store locations to the interstates (I-81, I-40, and I-75) within 
the Tri-State region and near state lines of Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia. The 
participant stores are coded as Chain #1, Chain #2, and Chain #3 depending upon the frequency 
of their occurrences along the interstates route and largest to smallest number of stores visited.  
The total number of stores and purchases made at Chain #1 in this region combined 
accumulative was twenty (20) individual purchases utilizing twenty (20) individual cashiers for 
point of sale transactions made at fifteen (15) different store locations within Chain #1.  The total 
number of stores and purchases made at Chain #2 in this region combined accumulative was 
eight (8) individual purchases utilizing eight (8) individual cashiers for point of sale transactions 
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made at seven (7) different store locations within Chain #2.  The total number of stores and 
purchases made at Chain #3 in this region combined accumulative was six (6) individual 
purchases utilizing six (6) individual cashiers for point of sale transactions made at six (6) 
different store locations within Chain #3. 
The individual cashier participants were all legally adults of eighteen years of age or 
older based upon each chain’s employee minimum age requirements for hiring.  Each front 
register cashier was randomly chosen by availability or convenience of the line length based 
upon the business of each store visited.  Each electronics counter cashier was chosen by 
convenience of who was working there at the time of purchase.  In some stores, it was difficult to 
find anyone working at the electronics counter and front register cashiers were randomly and 
conveniently utilized for electronic purchases that did not require an attendant to remove them 
from behind a locked glass security case.  Other cashier participants were chosen randomly by 
whom arrived when the bell at the electronics counter was rang asking for customer assistance to 
retrieve items locked in glass security cases and complete point of sale purchase transactions.  
Both male and female participants were randomly selected by convenience.  These male and 
female participants randomly included whites and blacks.    There were a total number of sixteen 
(16) male cashier participants, of which three (3) were black and thirteen (13) were white.  
Alternately, there were a total number of eighteen (18) female cashier participants, of which four 
(4) were black and fourteen (14) were white.  There were a total of fourteen (14) female cashiers, 
of which three (3) were black and eleven (11) were white:  and, six (6) male cashiers, of which 
zero (0) were black and six (6) were white at store Chain #1.  There were a total of three (3) 
female cashiers, of which one (1) was black and two (2) were white:  and, five (5) male cashiers, 
of which zero (0) were black and five (5) were white at store Chain #2.  Finally, at store Chain 
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#3, there was a total of one white (1) female cashier that assisted point of sale transaction, and 
five (5) male cashiers, of which three (3) were black and two (2) were white.  All stores 
combined equals thirty-four cashier participants, eighteen (18) females and sixteen (16) males 
randomly chosen by convenience.  These are the only demographics obtained pertaining to 
individuals logged for research purposes, and no further personal identifying information was 
gathered during these observational studies in order to protect the privacy and PID of each 
individual cashier participant during each point of sale transaction.  The purpose in documenting 
the demographics of male versus female, as well as black versus white, was to determine if there 
is a consistent difference in point of sale practices during transactions involving plastic card 
payments of MasterCard or Visa in either’s adherence to merchant agreement policies for 
checking for authorized signature on back of card and requiring government issued identification 
if the card is not signed. 
Table 2 
Demographics and Numbers of Participants: 
Gender and Race of Cashiers at POS Terminals, Face-to-Face Transactions 
Store Chain Females Males Totals Caucasian 
Ethnicity 
African 
American 
Ethnicity 
Totals 
#1 14 6 20 17 3 20 (59%) 
       
#2 3 5 8 7 1 8 (24%) 
       
#3 1 5 6 3 3 6 (18%) 
       
All Stores 
Combined 
18 
(53%) 
16 
(47%) 
34 
(100%) 
 
27 
(79%) 
7 
(21%) 
34 
(100%) 
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Distribution of POS Terminals  
Table 3 
POS (Point-of-Sale) Terminal Locations within Stores Utilized for Face-to-Face Transactions 
POS Terminal 
Location in Store 
Chain 
Electronics Counter in 
Back of Store 
Counter in Front 
of Store 
Total Combined 
Locations 
#1 10 10 20 
    
#2 3 5 8 
    
#3 2 4 6 
    
All Stores 
Combined 
15 
(44%) 
19  
(56%) 
34 
 
Purchases and Data Analysis Strategy 
The total amount of thirty-four (34) combined accumulative purchases was $1,730.48 at 
all three store chains, #1, #2, and #3—all made with credit/debit card payments in a five (5) 
consecutive days period.  Broken down, $787.64 was spent during transactions using a payment 
method of plastic credit/debit card at Chain #1; $261.01 at Chain #2; and $681.83 at Chain #3; 
finally, $50.55 at Chain #4.  The purchases varied in amounts ranging as low as $1.41 to as high 
as $246.07, with the average purchase price amounting to $50.89.   This figure was obtained by 
calculating the total of $1730.48 of all combined purchases divided by 34, the number of total 
transactions.  Specifically, there were twenty-three (23) purchases made that were under $50.00 
each and eleven (11) purchases made that were over $50.00 each.   
The purchases were all made over a busy long weekend and shopping holiday of 
Valentine’s Day weekend (Sunday, February 14, 2016) and President’s Day (Monday, February 
15, 2016) while children were out of school and many parents were given a day off at work.  
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Additionally, this period is also when many people are receiving their tax refunds and shopping 
capacity is at its peak volume.  Also, purchases were made at different times of the day and night 
hours to observe any discrepancies in cashiers’ adherence to merchant agreement policies of 
credit/debit card payments to either check for authorized signature and government issued photo 
identification or not, due to busy hours and long lines, versus least busy hours and no lines.  
Specifically, each segment of the twenty-four (24) hour cycle was broken down into four 
categories as follows:  12:01 am midnight to 6:00 am as segment 1; 6:01 am to 12:00 noon as 
segment 2; 12:01 noon to 6:00 pm as segment 3; and 6:01 pm to 12:00 midnight as segment 4.  
There were a total number of two (2) purchases made during segment 1, which was the least 
busiest time for shopping; seven (7) purchases made during segment 2, which was a moderately 
busy time for shopping; fourteen (14) purchases made during segment 3, which was the busiest 
time overall for shopping; and eleven (11) purchases made during segment 4, which was a 
moderately busy time for shopping.    
Of the thirty-four (34) purchases made, fifteen (15) of them were made at each store’s 
electronics counter located in the back near the electronic item purchases; while nineteen (19) of 
them were made at a front register either because the item purchased was not an electronic item, 
or no one was available at the back electronic counter to assist in the point of sale transaction.  
The purpose in choosing electronic counter cashiers versus front register cashiers was to observe 
any differences in cashier’s adherence to merchant agreement policies when payments involved a 
MasterCard or Visa credit/debit card transaction.  Also, being observed were differences in store 
practices of security measures in point of sale transactions made at electronic counters for 
electronic items commonly targeted by thieves, versus other store items not as commonly 
targeted.  Specifically, ten (10) electronic purchases were made at the electronics registers in 
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back of store Chain #1, three (3) electronic purchases were made at the back electronics registers 
at store Chain #2,  and two (2) electronic purchases were made at the back electronics registers at 
store Chain #3.  Ten (10) non-electronic purchases were made at front registers of store Chain 
#1; four (4) non-electronic purchases and one (1) electronic purchase was made at the front 
registers of store Chain #2; zero non-electronic related purchases were made at store Chain #3 (it 
is an all electronics chain store), but six (6) electronic related purchases were made at store 
Chain #3, of which two (2) occurred at back registers near the large items purchased –one being 
a 32” flat screen television with a built in Roku box and the other being an LG 700W stereo 
system—and four smaller items purchased (4) occurring at front registers. Total number of 
electronic purchases at all stores combined was twenty (20).  Total number of non-electronic 
purchases combined at all stores was fourteen (14).  One purchase made at the electronics 
counter was not electronics items but rather dog food, candy and clothing.  Whereas, several (at 
least five) electronic purchases were made at front registers versus back electronic counters for 
various reasons, primarily lack of cashier assistance available at back electronics department 
registers.  
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Table 4 
Time Segments when Purchases Were Made  
Store Chain# 
(Coded) 
Segment 1 
(12:00 am – 
6:00 am) 
Segment 2 
(6:01 am-  
12:00 pm) 
Segment 3 
(12:01 pm – 
6:00 pm) 
Segment 4 
(6:01 pm – 
11:59 pm) 
#1 2 5 8 5 
#2 0 1 3 4 
#3 0 1 3 2 
All Stores 
Combined 
2 
(6%) 
7 
(21%) 
14 
(41%) 
11 
(32%) 
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Table 5 
Itemized List of 34 Purchases, Charges Incurred, and Technology Used for Transaction 
(Arranged in alphabetical order) 
Item 
Purchased 
Store 
Chain 
(Coded) 
Electronic 
or Non-
Electronic 
Amount 
Charged 
to Card 
Card Used 
For 
Purchase  
(Coded) 
EMV 
Chip  
PIN Magnetic 
Stripe 
Electronic 
Signature 
Required 
32” Flat screen 
TV 
3 Electronic 
Item 
$240.73 MasterCard 
2222 
Yes No No Yes 
Bananas and 
Vitamin Drink 
1 Non-
Electronic 
Items 
$2.76 MasterCard 
1111 
Yes No No No 
Bathroom 
Tissue 
1 Non-
Electronic 
Item 
$9.85 MasterCard 
2222 
 
Yes No No No 
Beats 
Headphones 
2 Electronic 
Item 
$116.62 MasterCard 
2222 
Yes No No Yes 
Birthday Cards 1 Non-
Electronic 
Item 
$6.50 MasterCard 
1111 
Yes No No No 
Black Light 
Bulb 
2 Non-
Electronic 
Item 
$5.86 MasterCard 
1111 
Yes No No No 
Camera Tripod, 
DVD 
2 Electronics 
Related 
Item 
$57.05 MasterCard 
1111 
Yes No No Yes 
Canon Camera 
Bag 
3 Electronic 
Related 
Item 
$23.49 MasterCard 
1111 
 
No No No No 
Canon Photo 
Printer + 
Glossy 
3 Electronic 
Item 
$150.01 Visa Debit 
3333  
No Yes Yes Yes 
Cat Food, 
Bottled Water 
1 Non-
Electronic 
Items 
$10.24 MasterCard 
1111 
Yes No No No 
Chips, Gum 1 Non-
Electronics  
Item 
$4.67 MasterCard 
2222 
Yes No No No 
Composite AV 
Cable 
1 Electronics 
Related 
Item 
$10.49 MasterCard 
1111 
Yes No No No 
91 
 
Item 
Purchased 
Store 
Chain 
(Coded) 
Electronic 
or Non-
Electronic  
Amount 
Charged 
to Card 
Card Used 
for 
Purchase 
(Coded) 
EMV 
Chip 
PIN Magnetic 
Stripe 
Signature 
Required 
DVD 2 Electronics 
Related 
Item 
$5.49 Visa Debit 
3333 
No Yes Yes No 
DVD/VCR 
Combo 
1 Electronic 
Item 
$113.25 MasterCard 
2222 
Yes No No Yes 
DVD’s 1 Electronics 
Related 
Items 
$13.87 Visa-Debit 
3333 
No Yes Yes No 
Energizer 
Rechargeable 
Battery Pack 
1 Electronics 
Related 
Item 
$20.82 MasterCard 
2222 
Yes No No No 
Ethernet Inline 
Coupler 
3 Electronics 
Related 
Item 
$10.94 MasterCard 
2222 
Yes No No No 
Fireproof 
Security File 
2 Non-
Electronic 
Item 
$69.52 MasterCard 
1111 
Yes No No Yes 
Flat Screen TV 
Wall Mount 
1 Electronics 
Related 
Item 
$95.13 MasterCard 
1111 
Yes No No Yes 
Generic 
Acetaminophen 
2 Non-
Electronic 
Item 
$3.27 MasterCard 
1111 
Yes No No No 
Gloves 1 Non-
Electronic 
Item 
$4.38 MasterCard 
1111 
Yes No No No 
Gum, Dasani 2 Non-
Electronic 
Items 
$3.09 MasterCard 
1111 
Yes No No No 
LG 700W 
Shelf Stereo 
3 Electronic 
Item 
$246.07 MasterCard 
2222 
Yes No No Yes 
Listerine 
Mouthwash 
1 Non-
Electronic 
Item 
$6.54 MasterCard 
1111 
Yes No No No 
Magellan GPS 1 Electronic 
Item 
$106.46 MasterCard 
2222 
Yes No No Yes 
Pillow, Dog 
Food, Shirt 
1 Non-
Electronic 
Items 
$26.58 MasterCard 
1111 
Yes No No No 
Popcorn 2 Non-
Electronic 
Item 
$1.41 MasterCard 
1111 
Yes No No No 
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Item 
Purchased 
Store 
Chain 
(Coded) 
Electronic 
or Non-
Electronic 
Amount 
Charged 
to Card 
Card Used 
for 
Purchase 
(Coded) 
EMV 
Chip  
PIN Magnetic 
Stripe 
Signature 
Required 
Princess Barbie 1 Non-
Electronic 
Item 
$9.88 MasterCard 
1111 
Yes No No No 
Samsung 
Android Cell 
Phone 
1 Electronic 
Item 
$206.14 MasterCard 
1111 
Yes No No Yes 
SanDisk 16GB 
Memory Card 
3 Electronics 
Related 
Item 
$10.91 MasterCard 
1111 
No No No No 
Straight Talk 
Phone Card 
1 Electronics 
Related 
Item 
$50.55  Visa 
4444 
Yes No No Yes 
Swimwear 1 Non-
Electronic 
Item 
$23.93 MasterCard 
1111 
Yes No No No 
Valentine 
Cards, Candy, 
Flowers 
1 Non-
Electronic 
Items 
$37.51 MasterCard 
1111 
Yes No No No 
Xbox 360 
Video Game 
1 Electronics 
Related 
Item 
$28.09 MasterCard 
2222 
Yes No No No 
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Table 6 
Electronics Related Purchases vs. Non-Electronics Related Purchases  
(34 Combined Purchases in Total) 
Number of 
Purchases 
Made at Store 
Chain 
Electronics 
Related Items 
Non-
Electronics 
Related Items 
Total Combined  
#1 10 10 20  
    
#2 4 4 8  
    
#3 6 0 6  
    
All Stores 
Combined 
20  
(59%) 
14  
(41%) 
34 
 
Credit Card Data Analysis and Coding 
The total number of sales transactions involving plastic credit/debit card payments were 
thirty-four (34) combined accumulative at all store chains and from all transactions.  Four 
different credit/debit cards were utilized where purchaser and observer both were the legal 
cardholder.  Of these four, two (2) of the credit/debit cards were MasterCard accounts (both with 
new chip technology and magnetic strip slide capability) and two (2) were Visa accounts (slide 
only cards still without chip technology).  For privacy purposes and maintenance of PID of the 
legal cardholder, these four credit cards will be coded as follows:  The first credit/debit 
MasterCard account primarily used for twenty (20) purchases, encrypted with chip technology 
and magnetic slide strip will be coded as ending in 1111; the second credit/debit MasterCard 
account secondarily used for ten (10) purchases, also encrypted with chip technology and 
magnetic slide strip will be coded as ending in 2222; the third debit Visa account thirdly used for 
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only three (3) purchases, and not yet encrypted with chip technology but only has magnetic slide 
strip that requires a pin number to complete transactions will be coded as ending in 3333; and 
finally, the fourth credit Visa account lastly used for only one (1) purchase, and not yet encrypted 
with chip technology but only has magnetic slide strip that does not require a pin number will be 
coded as ending in 4444.  None of the previously described and coded cards have been officially 
signed by the researcher and legal cardholder, nor any other person; therefore, the backs of each 
card are blank in the white strips provided for “Authorized Signature” and stated as “Not Valid 
Unless Signed” by the card issuer.   
There were a total number of thirty-one point of sales transactions made with three credit 
cards coded above as ending in 1111, 2222, and 4444 that did not require a pin number for 
transactions to be completed by cashiers.  The total amount of charges applied to MasterCard for 
combined twenty purchases was $613.06 on card coded as ending in 1111.  The total amount of 
charges applied to MasterCard account for combined ten (10) purchases was $897.50 on card 
coded as ending in 2222.  And the total amount of charges applied to Visa credit card account 
coded as ending in 4444 was $50.55.  Two of these cards were equipped with chip technology 
(1111 and 2222), and one was slide only (4444).  There were a total of three point of sale 
transactions totaling $169.37 combined that required a pin number and they were all involving 
the Visa debit card coded as ending in 3333, of which, the legal cardholder and researcher knew 
the correct pin number associated with this account.  One transaction occurred at store Chain #1, 
one occurred at store Chain #2, and one occurred at store Chain #3—each being debit 
transactions.  Zero (0) of the remaining thirty-one purchases made with credit cards equipped 
with chip technology or not (1111, 2222, and 4444), ultimately required a pin number to 
complete these in store point of sale transactions.   (Add total combined purchase amount) 
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Two of those specific transactions, both made at store Chain #3 (where only electronic 
related items are sold) and both using MasterCard account coded as ending in 1111 and 
encrypted with chip technology, but also containing a magnetic slide strip were prompted by the 
electronic signature pad system to provide a pin number.  However, when the researcher and 
legal cardholder told the cashiers at each store (one transaction involving a white female cashier, 
and one transaction involving a black male cashier) that she could not remember the pin number 
the system was prompting her for, each one offered to assist her by putting the account number 
in manually from another screen.  Once the account number was properly entered manually, then 
the cashier was prompted to enter the three digit security code on the back of the card.  Each 
cashier during each one of the two individual transactions at two different store locations within 
the region, held the card in their hand viewing the back of the card to see and enter the security 
code located at the end of the white strip on the back that is designated for the authorized 
signature.  Both of these two cashiers had opportunity to see that the card was not properly 
signed and the white area was blank.  They each also had opportunity to read the statement near 
the blank strip that read “Not Valid Unless Signed.”  Neither of the cashiers said anything to the 
legal cardholder and purchaser during the transaction about the need to sign her card nor their 
need of verifying who she was by asking to see her photo identification according to 
MasterCard’s merchant agreement, since the card was not signed and authorized for use.  Each 
one of these two cashiers at two different store locations of Chain #3 successfully completed the 
transactions for her manually without the need or use of a pin number as the electronic signature 
pad and system was requesting.  Both of these transactions were made at front registers of this 
store chain.  The amount of one purchase was $10.91 and the item was a SanDisk 16 GB 
Memory Card.  The amount of the other purchase was $$63.17 and the item was a Canon Gadget 
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Camera Bag.  This purchase involved $40.00 cash and $23.17 on MasterCard coded as ending in 
1111.  It is worth mentioning that these two individual purchases were made at busy shopping 
times of the day, with one purchase made at peak busy hours at 4:06 pm and the other at 
moderately busy shopping hours of 11:18 am.   
Table 7 
Total Charges Incurred at Each Store Chain from All 34 Transactions 
Store Chain # 
(Coded) 
Charges 
Applied to 
Card “1111” 
Charges 
Applied to 
Card “2222” 
Charges 
Applied to 
Card “3333” 
Charges 
Applied to 
Card “4444” 
Totals 
#1 $440.08 $283.14 $13.87 $50.55 $787.64 
(46%) 
#2 $138.90 $116.62 $5.49           $0 $261.01 
(15%) 
#3 $34.08 $497.74 $150.01 $0 $681.83 
(39%) 
All Stores 
Combined 
$613.06 
(35 %) 
$897.50 
(52%) 
$169.37 
(10%) 
$50.55 
(3%) 
$1730.48 
(Combined 
%’s = 
100%) 
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Table 8 
Number of Sales Transactions Attributed to Each Card 
Card “1111” Card “2222” Card “3333” Card “4444” 
20 (59%) 10 (29%) 3 (9%)  1 (3%) 
 
Summary of Transactions 
A summary of the thirty-four (34) individual transactions is as follows:  twenty-eight 
different stores were selected accessed randomly by convenience along I-81, I-40, I-75, and I-26 
within Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia for a combined accumulative of thirty-
four (34) separate transactions involving thirty-four (34) separate individual cashiers who were 
also selected randomly based upon who was available at the register to assist my transaction at 
the time the transaction occurred, but were somewhat balanced between eighteen (18) female 
cashiers and sixteen (16) male cashiers.  The times of these transactions took place and were 
coded within four segmented hours of the twenty-four hour cycle:  12:01 am-6:00 am; 6:01 am – 
12:00 noon; 12:01 noon – 6pm; and 6:01 pm – 12:00 midnight in order to establish the busiest to 
least busiest shopping hours and how this could have an effect upon the cashiers’ attention to 
maintain merchant agreement or store policy pertaining to plastic card transactions.  Thirty-one 
of these thirty-four (34) in store point of sale transactions did not require a pin number to 
complete the transaction.  Three of these transactions did require a pin number, and they were all 
made using a Visa debit card coded as ending in 3333.  Twenty-three of these transactions were 
made without the need for an electronic signature.  All of these twenty-three (23) transactions 
were under $50.00 each.  Each of the eleven (11) transactions that were made with a purchase 
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amount over $50.00 each did in fact require an electronic signature and it was stated on the 
receipts of store Chain #1 as ‘signature verified.’  The total amount of charges applied to a 
combination of four (4) credit/debit cards utilized was $1,730.48 over a five (5) day period of 
shopping and observations.  $787.64 was spent at store Chain #1 (at fifteen separate stores).  
$261.01 was spent at store Chain #2 (at eight separate stores).  $681.83 was spent at store Chain 
#3 (at six separate stores).  Two MasterCard accounts were used with chip technology and two 
Visa accounts were used, one debit and one credit, without chip technology and magnetic slide 
strips and pin numbers.  These cards were coded as ending in 1111, and 2222 for the two 
MasterCard accounts; and, 3333 and 4444 for the two Visa card accounts.  The total amount 
charged at all stores and chains for MasterCard ending in 1111 was $613.06.  The total amount 
charged at all stores and chains for MasterCard ending in 2222 was $897.50.  The total amount 
charged at all stores and chains for Visa debit ending in 3333 was $169.37.  Last, the total 
amount charged at all stores and chains for Visa credit ending in 4444 was $50.55.  The times of 
the day or night were recorded as well as the amount of purchase and the gender and race of the 
cashier for comparison purposes.  Fifteen electronic purchases were made using electronic 
counters and nineteen non-electronic purchases were made using front registers for comparative 
purposes of cashier merchants’ agreement management.  Receipts were saved for documentation 
but are stored securely in a locked security box.   
The following Tables 9-12 are test questions analyzing for absence or presence of capable 
guardianship, while applying the R.A.T. based upon the accumulative documentations made on 
each observations report (See Appendix A):   
 
 
99 
 
Table 9 
Test Question 1 Results for Analyzing Capable Guardianship 
Test Question 1 for Analyzing Capable Guardianship: 
Did the cashier participant at the POS terminal ask to see the researcher’s card in hand being 
used for payment during any time for any reason while the face-to-face sales transaction 
occurred? 
Store Chain # (Coded) YES NO 
#1 0:20 (0%) 20:20 (100%) 
#2 0:8   (0%) 8:8    (100%) 
#3   2:6   (33%) 4:6   (67%) 
 
Table 10 
Test Question 2 Results for Analyzing Capable Guardianship 
Test Question #2 for Analyzing Capable Guardianship:   
Did the cashier specifically check the account numbers or the back of the card to see if the card 
being used for payment was signed and valid or unsigned and not valid for purchases? 
Store Chain # (Coded) YES NO 
#1 0:20 (0%) 20:20 (100%) 
#2 0:8   (0%) 8:8    (100%) 
#3 0:6   (0%) 6:6   (100%) 
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Table 11 
Test Question 3 Results for Analyzing Capable Guardianship 
Test Question #3 for Analyzing Capable Guardianship:   
Did the cashier participant ask the researcher to sign her unsigned card, deemed by Visa and 
MasterCard alike as “not valid” for purchases, in his or her presence to legitimately authorize it 
before the face-to-face sales transaction could be processed and completed at the POS terminal? 
 
Store Chain # (Coded) YES NO 
#1 0:20 (0%) 20:20 (100%) 
#2 0:8  (0%) 8:8   (100%) 
#3 0:6  (0%) 6:6   (100%) 
 
Table 12 
Test Question 4 Results for Analyzing Capable Guardianship 
Test Question #4 for Analyzing Capable Guardianship: 
Did the cashier participant at the POS terminal ask to see the researcher’s government issued 
photo identification bearing her genuine signature to compare it to the requested signature 
provided in the presence of the cashier at any time during the face-to-face card in hand in store 
sales transaction? 
 Store Chain # (Coded) YES NO 
#1 0:20  (0%) 20:20 (100%) 
#2 0:8   (0%) 8:8    (100%) 
#3 0:6   (0%) 6:6   (100%) 
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Table 13 
Results of Accumulative %’s of All Test Questions Combined for Analyzing Capable 
Guardianship 
 
 
Store Chain # 
 
 
TEST QUESTIONS FOR ANALYZING GUARDIANSHIP 
1 2 3 4 TOTAL 
COMBINED  
#1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
#2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
#3 33% 0% 0% 0% 8% 
 
This table demonstrates that there was an overall absence of capable guardianship by all 
three store chains at POS terminals and that their employees are not adhering to Visa and 
MasterCard policy guidelines outlined by the merchant contracts for acceptance of card 
payments.  Store chain #3’s percentage of 33% indicates only that there were two (2) employees 
that actually took the researcher’s credit card in hand before completing the transaction, but it 
does not explain that those same two employees did so because the researcher could not 
remember her PIN number being prompted by the electronic processing system and that these 
two participants, at separate stores and states but within the same store chain, too her card and 
looked on the back of the card specifically to find the security CVV code to manually input into 
the system on their side in order to override the need for inputting a PIN number.  Both of these 
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participants had opportunity to notice whether the card was signed and authorized but neither 
did.  So in effect, these two were actually more negligent and there was a greater absence of 
capable guardianship demonstrated in these numbers that what appears in the table.   
Table 14 
Variates 1 & 2 in Demographics’ Effects on Presence of Capable Guardianship 
 
STORE  
CHAIN 
(CODED) 
VARIATES of 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
GENDER RACE 
MALE FEMALE WHITE OR 
CAUSASIAN 
BLACK OR 
AFRICAN 
AMERICAN 
#1 0% 0% 0% 0% 
#2 0% 0% 0% 0% 
#3 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 
The 0 %’s represent the percentages of males, and females, both Black and White that 
demonstrated increased levels of guardianship during accumulative transactions.  As this table 
represents, race nor gender increased levels of capable guardianship and there were no 
differences observed between male or female participants, nor Black or White participants at 
POS terminals in each store chain.  This table also indicates and overall absence of capable 
guardianship for both genders and races.  In conclusion, the variates of race and gender has had 
no significant impact on the outcome of this study.  Zero percent (0%) of both races and genders 
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checked the back of the unsigned card being processed for an authorized signature, nor did they 
require it to be signed nor ask for government issued photo identification.   
Table 15 
Variates 3, 4, & 5’s Effects on Presence of Capable Guardianship 
(Electronic vs. Non-Electronic, Location of POS Terminal inside Store (Front or Back), and 
Time Segment of Shopping Hours) 
 
 
STORE 
CHAIN 
(CODED) 
SALES TRANSACTION VARIATES  
ELECTRONIC ITEM 
VS. NON-
ELECTRONIC ITEM 
BACK POS TERMINAL 
VS.  
FRONT POS 
TERMINAL 
TIME SEGMENT 
(Busy vs. 
 Not Busy) 
 
Electronic Non-
Electronic 
Front of 
store 
Back of 
store 
1 2 3 4 
#1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
#2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
#3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 
This table demonstrates that these three variates: 1) Electronic item vs. non-electronic 
item, and where the POS terminal was located within the store, 2) Back of store at electronics 
counter vs. front of the store at checkout near entrance, and 3) Time segment of the day that the 
transaction occurred and whether the store was experiencing busy shopping hours versus not 
busy shopping hours, or opening or closing hours, made absolutely no impact on the study or 
outcome.  There was not a higher level of guardianship demonstrated by the participants even 
when the item was an electronics items or the POS terminal was located in the electronics 
department.  The time segment in which the transaction occurred did not make an impact upon 
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increasing the presence of guardianship.  Overall, there was a generalized absence of capable 
guardianship demonstrated by all three store chains regardless of all three of these variates.  Not 
one participant checked the back of the credit card to authenticate the researcher’s identity prior 
to processing each transaction.  Not one participant required the unsigned card to be signed nor 
did anyone of the participants request or require government issued photo identification.   
Findings on Guardianship Efforts by Participants at POS Terminals 
Research Question 1 Findings and Hypothesis Discussed 
RQ1:  The first research question contains five parts:  1) Will the cashier at the point of 
sale transaction act as a capable guardian over the face-to-face transaction and act to help prevent 
identity theft and credit/debit card fraud by taking the card into his or her hand to visually check 
the back of the credit or debit card to see if it bears an authorized signature by the legal 
cardholder, or check the account number on the card and compare it to that in the system or 
receipt in according to the merchant agreement rules as mandated by the Bank Rules and 
Regulations, Visa and MasterCard?  (See Appendices B, C, & D).  Variables investigated:   
2) Will the variables of non-electronic versus electronic purchase increase levels of capable 
guardianship?  Will there be a difference in the level of capable guardianship if the purchase is 
made at the back electronic counter POS terminal versus the store’s front end POS terminal?  3) 
Will the higher amount of purchase charges to the card raise levels of guardianship at POS 
terminals with electronic purchases compared to a low levels of guardianship for small charges 
to the card?  4)  Will the variables of time segment of day or night and business or lack thereof 
give increase or decrease to the levels of capable guardianship?  5)  Will there be a difference of 
levels of guardianship based upon gender or race of the employee processing the transaction at 
each POS terminal? 
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  Findings:  Table 10 Test Question #2 for Analyzing Capable Guardianship:   
Did the cashier specifically check the account numbers or the back of the card to see if the card 
being used for payment was signed and valid or unsigned and not valid for purchases?, 
demonstrates that zero percent (0%) of the participants specifically checked the back of the 
researcher’s unsigned card for an authorized signature validating the card for use.  (See page 101 
for Table 10).  Additionally, the five variates investigated to determine if each in itself or in 
combination with other variates would raise the level of guardianship and persuade or require the 
participant employees conducting each transaction at the POS terminals to ask for the 
researcher’s card to specifically check for an authorized signature or compare the account 
information of numbers on the front of the card to that which was showing in the system.  None 
of these five variates had any impact whatsoever on raising the level of guardianship.  The 
findings conclude that there is an overall absence of capable guardianship at these three store 
chains POS terminals.  (See Table 14, page 104, for variates of demographics of race and 
gender; see Table 15, page 105, for variates of electronic vs. non-electronic items, time segment 
of purchase and busy hours or not, and costs of items. See also Tables 11-13, pages 102-103, for 
test questions determine absence or presence of capable guardianship.) 
 Hypothesis discussed:  Ho1 is validated and proven to be correct based upon the findings 
that conclude that zero percentage (0%) of the 34 participants at the 28 stores patronized for 
shopping within the three separate store chains within the Tri-State region checked the back of 
the researcher’s credit or debit card specifically for an authorized signature.  Ho1 hypothesized 
that there would be none that would check the back of her card to see it was unsigned nor require 
her to sign it, indicating that there is an overall absence of capable guardianship at these 
106 
 
particular retail store chains POS terminals.  This validated hypothesis is a critical element to the 
purpose of this research and the theory behind it.   
Research Question 2 Findings and Hypothesis Discussed 
RQ2:  Will the cashier at the face-to-face transaction at the POS (point-of-sale) terminal 
require the cardholder and purchaser to sign the back of the unsigned card used for purchase, and 
will he or she make her show a government issued photo identification for verification of her 
identity before the transaction is allowed to be processed through, in keeping with merchant 
agreement rules as mandated by Bank Rules and Regulations, Visa and MasterCard? 
Findings:  As demonstrated in Table 12 Test Question #4 for Analyzing Capable 
Guardianship, the question was investigated:  Did the cashier participant at the POS terminal 
ask to see the researcher’s government issued photo identification bearing her genuine signature 
to compare it to the requested signature provided in the presence of the cashier at any time 
during the face-to-face card in hand in store sales transaction? The results of all 34 individual 
transactions conducted by 34 individual participants and accumulated from 28 stores within three 
national store chains yielded the same zero percent (0%) collectively. (See page 102 for Table 
12).  
Hypothesis discussed:  Ho2 was proven to be correct by this study.  Not one employee 
participant asked to see the researcher’s government issued photo identification as mandated by 
Visa and MasterCard card acceptance guidelines when the credit or debit card is unsigned and 
not authorized or valid for use.  It should be noted that Visa nor MasterCard does not require 
photo identification for processing signed and authorized cards, but both do so for unsigned 
cards (See Appendices A, B, & C).  
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Research Question 3 Findings and Hypothesis Discussed 
RQ3:  Will the cashier act in lieu of an FDE (Forensic Document Examiner) to 
investigate by visual comparison the general similarities or differences of handwriting 
demonstrated on the government issued photo identification bearing a genuine signature of the 
researcher to that of the unsigned card that should be required to be signed in the presence of the 
cashier at the POS terminal? 
Findings:  As demonstrated in Table 9 Test Question 1 for Analyzing Capable 
Guardianship:  Did the cashier participant at the POS terminal ask to see the researcher’s card 
in hand being used for payment during any time for any reason while the face-to-face sales 
transaction occurred?, there were 0% of participants who took the card in hand specifically to 
check for an authorized signature on the back of the card’s signature strip.  Subsequently, there 
were no participants that requested to see government issued photo ID (see Table 12) and have a 
genuine signature to visualize and used for comparison.  None of the participants personally 
looked at the researcher’s signature on either.  So zero percent (0%) of the participants attempted 
to act in lieu of a Forensic Document Examiner (FDE) to determine if the generalized 
appearance of the signatures being compared were genuine or spurious.   
Hypothesis discussed:  Therefore, since zero percent (0%) of the participants attempted to 
act in lieu of a Forensic Document Examiner (FDE) to determine if the generalized appearance 
of the signatures being compared were genuine or spurious.  Ho3 is validated and found to be 
correct in this study by these participants only.  It is important to note that there are other retail 
stores that do train there their employee participants to attempt to visualize and compare 
signatures for general similarities or differences but not on the forensic as an FDE.   
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Research Question 4 Findings and Hypothesis Discussed 
RQ4:  Will the cashier rely solely upon the electronic capturing device to verify the 
signature and not personally look at it himself or herself? 
Findings:  Once again, as demonstrated in Table 9 Test Question 1 for Analyzing Capable 
Guardianship:  Did the cashier participant at the POS terminal ask to see the researcher’s card 
in hand being used for payment during any time for any reason while the face-to-face sales 
transaction occurred?, there were 0% of participants who took the card in hand specifically to 
check for an authorized signature on the back of the card’s signature strip.  Subsequently, there 
were no participants that requested to see government issued photo ID (see Table 12) and have a 
genuine signature to visualize and used for comparison.  None of the participants personally 
looked at the researcher’s signature on either.   
Hypothesis discussed:  Therefore, Ho4, which hypothesized that the participants would 
demonstrate accumulative results showing their overall reliance upon technology to process and 
check for genuine signatures is validated and found to be correct.  Table 5 Itemized List of 34 
Purchases, Charges Incurred, and Technology Used for Transaction, provides an itemized list of 
the technology that was relied upon for each transaction to be completed.  (See pages 92-94)    
Research Question 5 Findings and Hypothesis Discussed 
RQ5:  Will the participant cashier at the POS terminal solely depend upon the EMV chip 
reader technology newly implemented at the POS terminals equipped with such to “guard” over 
the identity of the cardholder, even when neither a PIN number nor signature is required nor 
requested for the transaction to be processed? 
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Findings:  There were comments made by several participants at two separate store 
chains, #1 and #3, that were included into the additional notes section on the observation reports 
that the new EMV chip technology made the transaction so safe that they did not need a PIN 
number for card transactions anymore, when the researcher was asking if she needed to input a 
PIN number to process the transaction because she did not have one with the particular card 
being utilized for each of those transactions.    
Hypothesis discussed:  This observational finding indicates that there is a false 
expectation by the employee participants of the new EMV chip technology to completely 
eradicate identity theft related to card fraud, and that it will in essence “guard” over the 
cardholder’s account even without a PIN number.  It is reasonable to assume this hypothesis to 
be somewhat validated based upon those few additional comments made by several participants 
during those transactions.  However, this particular research question and hypothesis would be 
better investigated and validated by future research involving interviews or surveys completed by 
employee participants and managers.   
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSIONS 
In reviewing the purpose of this research study, the problem of identity theft and plastic 
card fraud has been increasingly become a national and international problem.  The significance 
of this crime has contributed to rise in white collar criminal activity and has subsequently 
warranted the increase in technological advances to curtail it, such as electronic signature pads to 
capture and store digitized signatures, and also the need to implement encrypted chips into 
American credit/debit cards for security purposes.  The areas being investigated by this 
observational study include two major questions:  1) Are cashiers at point of sale transactions 
inside the three major department stores that are commonly targeted for fraudulent purchases by 
plastic card means acting as capable guardians (applying the R.A.T. criminology theory) by 
checking the backs of credit cards to see if they are authorized with a genuine signature?  And 2)  
If the card is not signed and authorized to make it valid for purchases, are the cashiers asking for 
or requiring government issued photo identification with a genuine handwritten signature for 
identification verification purposes and comparison?  To investigate these questions, thirty-four 
individual transactions were made with thirty-four individual cashiers at twenty-eight separate 
store locations within the three major department store chains, which were coded for privacy.  
These stores were located within East Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia.  Four 
separate credit/debit cards were used to make these thirty-four purchases, two of which were 
MasterCard accounts using chip technology, and two of which were Visa accounts using 
magnetic slide strips only.  The results of this observational study were significant in realizing 
the absence of capable guardianship at in store point of sale contacts between employees and 
purchasers.  Regardless of time of day transaction took place, or whether or not the store was 
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busy with other customers waiting in line, or whether the cashier was a female or a male, black 
or white, no one checked the back of the credit card for an authorized signature.  Nor did they 
follow up according to merchant agreement guidelines and rules of MasterCard and Visa to 
require a government issued photo identification with a genuine signature for comparison, nor 
require the purchaser, who was also the primary investigator to sign the back of the card in the 
white blank strip designated for “AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE” near the statement “NOT 
VALID UNLESS SIGNED”  This negligence is suspected to be in part or whole of improper 
training or incentives, or unreasonable reliance upon technology—whether it be the electronic 
signature pads capturing and storing the digitized marks made by purchasers or the new chips 
that have been encrypted into new credit cards, with or without the use of pin numbers or 
electronic signatures.  This research implies that genuine handwritten signatures are obsolete in 
store purchases of these specific three large department store chains, without the use of 
electronic signature pads.  The handwritten signature on the backs of the credit or debit cards 
authorizing the card and making it valid for use is forgotten in practice.   
Summary of Findings 
The most important findings that have emerged from this observational study are that it 
does not matter whether the store is busy or not busy, what time of the day or night a consumer 
shops, or at which of the three major department store chains that were patronized for purchases 
of electronic items or non-electronic item; or whether the cashier is male or female, Black or 
White, the cashiers are not aggressively acting in roles of capable guardians to prevent or 
minimize identity theft and credit/debit card fraud.  Nor does it matter if the credit card being 
utilized has new chip technology or only a magnetic slide stripe, the point of sale transactions are 
not being guarded capably within these particularly common and popular three chains used for 
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many electronic purchases.  These specific chains were chosen because they are highly targeted 
by thieves who realize their opportunities for identity theft and credit/debit card fraud because of 
failure to capably guard point of sale transactions at registers, whether they are electronics 
counters or front end registers.  For reasons yet undisclosed and undiscovered by this qualitative 
study limited to observations only, cashiers are not effectively guarding sales transactions using 
plastic payment methods.  This could be in part or whole to improper training or incentives to do 
so, or it could be in part due to apathy or ignorance of merchant agreement rules of MasterCard 
and/or Visa, which requires an authorized signature on the back of each card issued to make the 
credit or debit card legally valid for in store use or otherwise.  These findings suggest that there 
is also a strong reliance upon technology for validation of credit or debit cards, and that the new 
chip technology, as well as the electronically verified signature, has replaced the former style of 
a legible signature of the legal cardholder and verification of it upon visual inspection and 
comparison to any government issued photo identification—at least in the minds of the cashiers 
of these particular store chains.  The old-fashioned handwritten signature of an in store purchaser 
either on the back of their credit card or receipt is all but forgotten it seems.  Why is this?  The 
answer to this question is yet to be discovered and warrants future investigation including cashier 
surveys and manager surveys.  The implication is there is an unwarrantedly strong, yet blind 
reliance upon technology—whether it be a chip in a credit card without a pin for protection, or 
whether it be an electronic signature that is inconsistently digitized by incongruent strokes or 
marks when signed in different electronically engineered e-pad systems or even using different 
signs and symbols to sign it.  The conception and perhaps ultimately misconception is that newer 
methods are better and safer, and that former simpler methods, like that of simply checking the 
back of a credit or debit card for an authorized signature is no longer necessary.  Thus, making it 
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unnecessary to require any government issued photo identification that would bear the likeness 
of image of purchaser or the likeness of their genuine handwritten signature.  Societal advances 
beyond common logical reasoning are not truly advances at all, are they?  If these technological 
advances were being used in conjunction with basic preventative measures, such as checking the 
back of a credit card and requiring a signature and photo identification if not authorized, then 
they would yield the ultimate capable guardianship potentials.  In conclusion, technological 
guardianship cannot currently be effective without capable human guardianship.   
Conclusions 
Are the cashiers acting as capable guardians during in store point of sale transactions, in 
keeping with store policies and merchant agreement contracts between the card issuers of 
MasterCard and Visa and the legal cardholders of the accounts, in efforts to help prevent and 
minimize identity theft and credit/debit card fraud?  Based upon this qualitative observational 
research, and these specific findings associated with these thirty-four individual transactions and 
coherently thirty-four individual cashiers at twenty-eight separate stores within three store chains 
in a four state region, the answer is ‘NO’, and one that warrants further investigation.  The 
specific objective of this observational study was to see if each cashier would check the back of 
the credit/debit card for an authorized signature and require government issued photo 
identification in the absence of an authorized signature.  The conditions involved whether the 
cashiers were male or female, and how busy or not the store was at the time of purchase.  These 
factors could have an impact on how the transaction was capably guarded or not.  For instance, if 
the store were busy and the lines were long, then the cashier, male or female would be less apt to 
act as a capable guardian due to job performance pressure and time constraints to keep customers 
from becoming impatient and irritable.  How a male guards the point of sale transaction may 
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differ from how a female would manage her role as guardian.  However, the findings were non-
specific to either time of day, busy hours or least busy hours; or whether the cashier acting in 
role of guardian were male, female, black or white.  
Limitations of Thesis Research 
This field research was limited strictly to observations made as a credit card payment 
purchaser in 28 separate large department stores of three commonly targeted chains—all located 
within the Tri-State region of Eastern Tennessee, Western Virginia, and Northeastern North 
Carolina and one in Georgia.  Therefore, it lacks sufficient quantity for external validity and 
large generalizability.  Additionally, it does not involve guardianship issues related to online 
identity theft and credit or debit card fraud that is also a major contributor of fraud.  The internal 
validity is weakened in that this study only portrays the observations of those representatives 
sampled within this specific region.  Therefore, the information gathered and coded for this 
analysis is restricted to observations only and not interviews with individual managers or 
employees, which may yield additional insight to findings.  There is little criminological research 
done on this specific area of adequate guardianship at point of sale transactions involving in store 
merchant sales clerk employees or managers and their adherence to the merchant agreement 
contracts as mandated by Visa, MasterCard and Bank Rules (See Appendix B, C, & D).  To date, 
no criminology research has been reported analyzing why large scale identity theft in credit and 
debit card fraud occurs at specific large department store chains or why they are strongly 
considered as suitable targets by motivated fraud offenders.   
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Recommendations  
Recommendations based upon this observational study include training of managers and 
employees as to the necessity of basic preventative measures of checking for signatures and 
asking for photo identification when there is none, in common sense efforts to prevent identity 
theft and plastic card fraud.  There is also an indication that sole reliance upon technology 
without these basic preventative measures leads to opportunities for identity theft and 
credit/debit card fraud to continue on aggressively as criminal minds search for system 
loopholes.  In comparing what has been discovered in data collection, data analysis, and 
discussion, this study reveals the need for educating cashiers to be better equipped at capable 
guardianship at point of sale contacts with purchasers and potential identity thieves using credit/ 
debit card fraud. This study reveals that cashiers are not acting as capable guardians in keeping 
with merchant agreement obligations with MasterCard and Visa and simply checking the backs 
of credit or debit cards to see if there is an authorized signature, nor asking for government 
issued photo identification if there is not.  Inadvertently, this study shows that handwritten 
signatures are a thing of the past at point of sale transactions and are primarily used only on 
electronic pads to make a mark—any mark.  If these store chains and others were to couple the 
use of technology  with aggressive preventative practices of checking for handwritten signatures 
and requiring photo identification for visual comparisons of the person and the person’s 
handwritten signatures, and do so consistently across all store chains and businesses, then in 
store fraudulent purchases would be expected to diminish.  Training cashiers to become adequate 
in capable human guardianship would provide most promising results in diminishing in store 
fraud occurring repeatedly at targeted store chains.  The Routine Activities Theory is the most 
plausible to be applied to these daily transactions within businesses and should be carefully 
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analyzed and utilized by security within each department store chain to develop the best overall 
plan for prevention of fraud.   
Future Research 
This study raises awareness and demonstrates the need for future research regarding the 
consumer habits of signing electronic signature pads and with what marks to determine the true 
value and usefulness of this technology in preventing or identifying identity theft and non-
genuine signatures of purchasers.  Future research is also indicated in determining the usefulness 
of chip technology without the use of pin numbers, and only chip and electronic signatures.  
While there is capacity to store electronic signatures and recall them on a need to know basis, the 
validity of the same may never come into question if there is no need to know and does not serve 
as a deterrent nor preventative of crime.  It is only somewhat useful if the legal cardholder and 
purchaser signs consistently with the same marks, or fluidity of digitized signature.  A cross 
study of international practices of other countries using both chip and pin technology, and other 
technology such as retina identification, etc. coupled with visual inspection of authorized 
signatures and photo identification with genuine signatures is imperative to gain a full 
comprehensive perspective on the practices that are most beneficial in curbing identity theft and 
credit/debit card fraud, in our American society, and international community.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: 
 
OBSERVATIONS REPORT 
 
Store Chain: ___________________________________________________ (Coded 1, 2 or 3) 
Store Location:  ______________________________________________ (TN, NC, VA, or GA) 
Time Category:  ________________________________________________ (Coded 1, 2, 3 or 4) 
Exact Time of Transaction and Observations:  ______________________________ (Not coded) 
Gender of Cashier at POS Terminal: _________________________________  (Male or Female) 
Race of Cashier at POS Terminal: ____________________________________ (White or Black) 
Counter:  _________________________________  (Back of Store Electronics or Front of Store) 
Classification of Item:  __________________________________ (Electronic or Non-Electronic) 
Item Purchased:  _______________________________________________________________  
Cost of Purchase:  ______________________________________________________________ 
Amount Charged to Card:  _______________________________________________________ 
Type of Card Used for Payment:  __________________________________ (MasterCard/VISA) 
Security Features of Card Used:  ___________________________________________________ 
    (EMV + Magnetic Strip vs. Magnetic Strip Only) 
Specific Card Used for Payment:  __________________________________________________ 
     (1:4 Choices, Coded as ending in:  1111, 2222, 3333, 4444) 
Did cashier check back of card for authorized signature? ________________________ (Yes/No) 
Did cashier note that card was not signed?  ___________________________________ (Yes/No) 
Did cashier ask for it to be signed in the cashier’s presence?  _____________________ (Yes/No) 
Did the cashier ask to see government issued photo identification? _________________(Yes/No) 
Did the purchase require an electronic signature?  ______________________________(Yes/No) 
Did the purchase require a pin number?  _____________________________________ (Yes/No) 
Additional:____________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix B: 
 
Bank Card Rules and Regulations 
 
 BANK CARD MERCHANT RULES AND REGULATIONS January 2004  
 
 -1 -  
 
 Since you (hereinafter "Merchant") have either entered into a Bank Card Merchant Agreement and/or related agreements (collectively referred to herein as 
"Bank Card Merchant Agreement") with Fifth Third Bank (collectively referred to herein as "FTB") or receive Visa and/or MasterCard acquiring and/or 
related services from FTB, Merchant agrees to comply with and be bound by these Bank Card Merchant Rules and Regulations ("Bank Rules"). These 
Bank Rules may be altered or amended from time to time at FTB’s sole discretion and without notice. Merchant also agrees to comply with and be bound 
by the Visa U.S.A Inc. By-Laws and Operating Regulations, the Visa International Operating Regulations and any other rules, policies or requirements of 
Visa or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates (collectively "Visa Rules") and the MasterCard International Inc. By-Laws and Operating Regulations and any 
other rules, policies or requirements of MasterCard or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates (collectively "MasterCard Rules"), any of which may be altered or 
amended from time to time and without notice, which are referenced herein and hereby incorporated into these Bank Rules as if fully rewritten herein. 
Except for those terms specifically defined herein, all capitalized terms used herein shall have the same meanings as ascribed to them in the Bank Card 
Merchant Agreement. Merchant may now, or in the future, participate in one or more other card programs which are supported by FTB in accordance with 
its standards ("Other Programs"), including but not limited to Voyager and Wright Express, and may receive services related to these Other Programs from 
FTB. In the event that Merchant participates in any such Other Programs, Merchant agrees to comply with and be bound by the Other Programs Bank 
Rules published by FTB from time to time, as well as any operating rules or regulations or any other rules, policies or requirements of the applicable Other 
Program(s) (“Other Program Rules”). Before Merchant participates in any Other Program, Merchant agrees that it shall request from FTB in writing a copy 
of the Other Programs Bank Rules. The Bank Card Merchant Agreement, Visa Rules, MasterCard Rules, Other Program Rules, Other Program Bank Rules 
and these Bank Rules are intended to be and shall be construed as consistent parts of a whole as applied to the applicable product type. In the event of a 
direct conflict between the Bank Card Merchant Agreement or the Bank Rules and the Visa Rules or the MasterCard Rules, the Visa Rules and MasterCard 
Rules shall control; provided, however, Merchant acknowledges and agrees that all agreements with respect to the obligations and liability of FTB are 
specified in the Bank Card Merchant Agreement and the Bank Card Merchant Agreement shall control on such subjects notwithstanding anything in the 
Bank Rules, Visa Rules, MasterCard Rules, Other Programs Bank Rules, and/or the Other Program Rules.  
A. Honoring of Cards  
 
1. The Merchant shall promptly and without discrimination honor all valid Cards within the appropriate categories of acceptance when properly presented 
as payment from Cardholders for the purchase of goods and/or services. The Merchant shall maintain a policy that shall not discriminate among customers 
seeking to make purchases through use of a valid Card. An unreadable magnetic stripe, in and of itself, does not deem a Card invalid.  
 
2. The Merchant shall not establish minimum or maximum sales transaction amounts as a condition for honoring a Card.  
 
3. The Merchant shall not impose any surcharge on sales transactions.  
 
4. Any purchase price advertised or otherwise disclosed by the Merchant must be the price available when payment is made with a Card.  
 
5. Any tax required to be collected by the Merchant must be included in the total transaction amount and not collected separately in cash.  
 
6. The Merchant shall validate all cards by ensuring the signature on the back of the Card matches the signature on the transaction receipt.  
 
7. The Merchant shall not accept any Card having two signatures on the signature panel located on the back of the Card.  
 
8. The Merchant shall not impose a requirement on Cardholders to provide any personal information, such as a (i) home or business telephone number, (ii) 
home or business address, (iii) driver's license number, (iv) photocopy of a driver's license or (v) photocopy of the Card, as a condition for honoring a Card 
unless such information is required (a) for mail order, telephone order, or electronic commerce transactions; (b) the transaction amount exceeds a pre-
determined dollar limit set by FTB; or (c) the information is required by the Card issuer. Except for the specific circumstances cited above, the Merchant 
shall not refuse to complete a sales transaction solely because a Cardholder who has complied with all of the conditions for presentment of a Card at the 
point-of-sale refuses to provide such additional personal information.  
 
9. A Merchant must not refuse to complete an electronic commerce transaction solely because the Cardholder does not have a digital certificate or other 
secured protocol.  
 
10. The Merchant shall not require a Cardholder, as a condition for honoring a Card, to sign a statement that in any way states or implies that the 
Cardholder waives any rights to dispute the transaction with the Card issuer or otherwise.  
 
B. Use of Service Marks  
 
1. The Merchant shall adequately display, in accordance with the Visa and MasterCard Rules, the Visa and MasterCard service marks, as applicable, at 
points of interaction and on promotional materials to indicate which Cards will be honored at the Merchant's place of business. At a minimum, the Visa and 
MasterCard service marks should be on display near the entrance of the Merchant's place of business and must not be less prominent than other service 
marks that the Merchant has on display (e.g., American Express, Discover).  
 
2. The Merchant may use the Visa and MasterCard wordmark on promotional, printed, or broadcast materials only to indicate that Cards are accepted for 
payment and shall not indicate, either directly or indirectly, that Visa and MasterCard endorse any goods and/or services.  
 
3. A merchant web site must display the Visa and MasterCard Marks in full color to  
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indicate card acceptance. The Visa and MasterCard wordmark should be used to indicate acceptance of cards when a visual representation of the marks is 
not possible at the merchant web site.  
 
4. The Merchant may not refer to Visa and MasterCard in stating eligibility for its products, services or membership.  
 
C. Authorization  
 
1. The Merchant shall obtain authorization for each sales transaction for the total amount of such transaction. For sales transactions not processed through 
an electronic terminal, the Merchant shall type or print legibly on the sales draft the authorization approval code evidencing the authorization so obtained.  
 
2. A Merchant must only deposit transaction receipts that directly result from Cardholder transactions with that Merchant. A Merchant must not deposit a 
transaction receipt that it knows or should have known to be either fraudulent or not authorized by the Cardholder  
 
3. A Merchant is responsible for its employees’ actions while in its employ.  
 
4. The Merchant's designated authorization center, or at FTB's option the authorization center designated by FTB (hereafter referred to as "Designated 
Authorization Center"), provides such Merchant approval or denial for sales transactions for specific dollar amounts. The Designated Authorization Center 
may also provide the Merchant with assistance in the following circumstances.  
 
a. When a sales transaction involves use of a Card and the total amount of the transaction is in excess of the then current and applicable floor limit, if any, 
in the Bank Card Merchant Agreement or if a zero floor limit is applicable to such transaction or if there is no mention of a floor limit in the Bank Card 
Merchant Agreement.  
 
b. When a sales transaction is completed in partial payment of a single purchase, authorization is required for the amount segment(s) of the purchase 
effected with the Card, regardless of the Merchant's floor limit.  
 
c. When a sales transaction is a mail order or telephone order transaction.  
 
d. When a sales transaction, other than mail order or telephone order, involves (i) a handwritten sales draft which does not contain the imprint of the 
Merchant plate or the Card, (ii) a Cardholder who is present but without the Card, (iii) a sales draft which is not signed by a Cardholder, (iv) an unsigned 
Card, (v) suspicious or unusual circumstances or (vi) an expired Card. When requesting authorization in such circumstances, the Merchant must advise the 
Designated Authorization Center of the specific reason(s) authorization is requested.  
 
(1) If the signature panel on the Card is blank, in addition to requesting authorization, the Merchant must do all of the following.  
(a) Review positive identification to determine that the user of the Card is the Cardholder. Such identification must consist of a current, official government 
identification document (e.g., passport, driver's license) that bears the Cardholder's signature. Such identification, including any serial number, social 
security number, or driver's license number and expiration date, must be indicated on the sales draft  
 
(b) Require the Cardholder to sign the signature panel of the Card prior to completing the transaction.  
 
(2) If a sales transaction involves suspicious or unusual circumstances, then the Merchant shall call the Designated Authorization Center and request a 
"Code 10" authorization.  
 
5. An authorization code only indicates the availability of a Cardholder's credit as of the time the authorization is obtained. An authorization is no guarantee 
that the person presenting the Card is the rightful Cardholder or that the transaction will not be charged back to the Merchant.  
6. In the event FTB for whatever reason is unable to obtain, or due to system delays chooses not to wait to obtain, authorization from the Cardholder’s 
financial institution, Visa or MasterCard, FTB may at its option “stand-in” for such entities and authorize the sales draft or sales transaction based on 
criteria established by FTB, and Merchant remains responsible for such sales draft or sales transaction in accordance with the Bank Card Merchant 
Agreement.  
7. If a sales transaction is not authorized, the Merchant must not complete the sale. A declined sales transaction is originated from the bank that issued the 
Card. The fact that a sales transaction was declined should not be interpreted as a reflection of the Cardholder's credit worthiness. If the Cardholder has any 
questions concerning the authorization, instruct such Cardholder to call the bank that issued the Card.  
D. Verification and Recovery of Cards  
 
1. If a transaction is not authorized, the Merchant must not complete the sale, and, if instructed by the Designated Authorization Center to pick-up the Card, 
the Merchant should do so by reasonable and peaceful means, notify the Designated Authorization Center when the Card has been recovered, and ask for 
further instructions.  
 
2. The Merchant shall use reasonable and peaceful means to recover any Card if (i) the account number thereon is listed on any Combined Warning 
Bulletin, (ii) the printed four digits above the embossed account number do not match the first four digits of the account number, (iii) the Merchant is 
advised to retain it or (iv) the Merchant has reasonable grounds to believe such Card is counterfeit, fraudulent or stolen. The Merchant shall also note the 
physical description of the  
 
Retrieved from www.finance.umich.edu/system/files/ccRulesRegs_Jan2004.doc 
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Appendix C: 
 
Visa Rules for Unsigned Cards 
 
  
Retrieved from https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/download/merchants/card-acceptance-guidelines-for-merchants.pdf 
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Appendix D: 
 
MasterCard Rules Unsigned Card 
 
 
Retrieved from https://www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/Unsigned_Credit_Cards-(Global).pdf 
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